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PREFACE
Congress was concerned with many aspects of the army. Congress had
created the Continental Army and felt very responsible for military affairs.
Thus under such close supervision the relations between Congress and its
military arm were many and varied. The army's finance, clothing, food, transportation, enlistments, and the place of state militias, were some of the
problems that confronted the Congress and army.
For this thesis I have chosen Congress's relations to the army in regard to war materiel. By war materiel, I mean such items a s arms, artillery,
gunpowder, and ammunition. Of course, some of the above mentioned problems will enter this thesis but I hope to study chiefly the difficulties Congress and Washington encountered in arming the Continental Army.
This thesis covers from the year, 1775, to the capture of Stony Point
in July, 1779. During those years the Congress found it most difficult to obtain a sufficient number of muskets and amount of powder. However, by the
year, 1779, the arms' crisis had subsided considerably. Moreover major
fighting in the North had ended for Washington's army. Most of Congress's
problems with Washington's army during the last two years of the war were not
concerned with supplying the army with war materiel but rather with food,
clothing, and pay. As the war around New York quieted the problem of military
i

stores lessened for Congress and Washington. Thus I ended this study of
Congress I s relations with the army in July, 1779.

11

CHAPTER I
MEN AND NO ARMS

The firing on Lexington Green, the brief stand at the North Bridge in
Concord and the hurried retreat of the redcoats to Boston found the MassachuI

setts Provincials ready for a clash of arms. As the colonists were familiar
with limited self-government, serious preparation for war had been going on for
months. Throughout New England the provincial legislatures, although extralegal bodies, had organized the militias into effective units, ordered the procurement of arms and ammunition, and appointed Committees of Safety.
The Committees of Safety carried on and extended the important work of
the earlier Committees of Correspondence. Many of those on the Committees
of Safety were merchants and tradesmen. These merchants were shrewd and
had a talent for thrift that enabled them to supply the colonies with good provisions. Their main task was to train and supply the militias both with men
and war materiel. If the situation demanded, the Committee of Safety was em1

2

powered to call out the miliUa. These Committees were aided in obtaining
arms for the militia by the decrees of the Provincial Congresses:

IIIf

any of

the said inhabitants are not provided with arms and ammunition, according to
law, that they immediately provide themselves there with, and that they use
their utmost diligence to perfect themselves in military skill. ,,1
Preparation for war was not a new task for the New England legislatures
since their miUtias had fought in the French and Indian War. Even the idea of
minute men was not new for in the middle of the 1750's there had been alarm
lists of men who were ready to fight the Indians at a moment's notice. The
militia consisted of the entire body of citizens of military age except clergymen
paupers, and certain others. Usually the Provincials possessed muskets but
few of them were marksmen. Muskets were not made for accuracy, powder was
scarce, and the farmer did not have much time to hunt or practice, contrary to
tradition. 2 A musket which weighed eleven pounds, was eleven gaugo, and
stood four feet, nine inches tall without a bayonet, was commonly used in New
England while the rifle was practically unknown. 3 The militia needed regular
1Allen French, The Day of Concord and Lexington, (Boston: Uttle,
Brown, and Co., 1925), p. 23.
2Ibid., pp. 255-56.
3J. W. Wright, II Rifle in the American Revolution, II American Historical
Review, XXIX, (Jan. 1924), 293-99.

3

training if they had any hopes of becoming marksmen. On certain days of the
year it was a custom that the militia mustered on the town green where the men
had more of a holiday than a training period.
However as relations with Great Britain became more tense, the assemblies stiffened their militia' s training and some even mustered every week for
shooting practice. Many of the colonies had company drill once a month,
regimental drill twice a year, and brigade drill once every two years.
Connecticut in 1114 could boast of twenty-thousand men in eighteen regiments
with at least a troop of horses to each regiment. 4
Through the efforts of the Committees of Safety the Provincial Congresses had created the militia into an army and these "armies" must remain
their servant. The Congresses and Committees were civilian bodies who were
determined to control not only the civil affairs of the colonies but also the
military affairs. These civilians who directed the militias were sensitive to
any military attitude that challenged their superiority. 5
The colonists became concerned in September, 1114, when General
Gage; Commander of the British Forces in America, ordered the gunpowder
4Willard M. Wallace, Appeal to Arms, (New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1951) I p. 3.
5Allen French, First Year of the American Revolution, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934) p. 49.
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reserve of Massachusetts to be seized. This brought about the "powder
alarm." Israel Putnam, who had led his Connecticut militia towards Boston,
returned when he heard that no blood had been shed. However, he did write
to the Massachusetts Assembly, "We much desire you to keep a strict guard
over the remainder of your powder; for that must be the great means, under
God, for the salvation of our country. ,,6

The assemblies soon realized that

this powder which was scarce was necessary for the protection of their
rights. With the purchase of military stores and the removal of war materiel
from royal arsenals, they began their preparations for hostilities. Although
the colonies were hindered by England's Declaration of non-importation of
military stores in December of 1774, they decided to try to import gunpowder
through the blockade. 7 The assemblies also encouraged the colonists to renew their own manufacture of war materiel.
In December, 1774, Rhode Island militia seized cannon and other
military stores from Fort George at Newport, while New Hampshire men captured arms and ammunit10n from Fort William and Mary at Portsmouth. The
6Sit George O. Trevelyan, American Revolution, I, p. 289, cited in
French, the Day of Concord and Lexinaton, p. 25.
7peter Force (ed.), American Archives, (9 vols.; Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1843-53), Fourth Serles, II, 276-77. (From now
on referred to as Force.)
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Governor of New Hampshire requested General Gage to send troops to guard
the King's stores, but before any help was sent, Paul Revere with 400 men
had seized 100 barrels of gunpowder, some 11ght cannon, and 60 muskets. 8
A British captain wrote to his superior officer after these assaults that "They
(Americans) intend to procure Powder and Ball, and Military Stores of all
kinds whenever they can get them •••• ,,9 This captain's opinion was correct
since the New England Assemblies realized that arms and ammunition might
be the saJvation of the colonies.
The colonies were destitute of ammunition and what powder was on
hand had l;een in the colonial stores since the French and Indian War. Most
of the powder mills were in ruins. So too, muskets were often in poor condition since there seems to have been no more than two hundred gunsmiths
in the colonies. 1 0 Nevertheless men in the colonies boasted as did one
Philadelphian to a Member of Parliament in England that the colony of
Pennsylvania alone could manufacture 100,000 stand of arms and gunpowder
8JR!sL, IV, I, 1041.
9 IblsL, IV, I, 1039-40.

1oEsmond Wright, . Fabric of Freedom. 1163-1800, (New York: Hill
and Wang, 196]), p. 128.
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more easily than it could be imported from England .11 The assemblies soon
realized such statements were merely hopes that seldom became facts.
The Massachusetts Committee of Safety worked diligently from
December, 177 .. , into the spring of 1775, in the acquisition of military stores.
Besides procuring food and mess kits they purchased powder, fuses I grape
and round shot, cartridge paper, mortars t musket balls, flints, cannons,
cannon carriages., and entrenching tools .12 Not only did the New England
Assemblies prepare for war but southern colonies also stiffened the training of
their militia and purchased whatever war materiel they could. In January,
1775, a Committee in Virginia resolved that a poll tax should be taken to
procure a quantity of ammunition which would provide for the "common defense of all. 1.13 George Washington was chairman of that committee.
Throughout February and March the Massachusetts Assembly encouraged the Provincials to produce arms and bayonets by placing a premium
on those made by a certain date. By early April, 1775, Massachusetts had
on hand in its arsenals an estimated 21,000 fire arms, 17,000 pounds of
11 Force, IV, I, 1066.
12·
.
~, IV, I, 1365-70.
13.IW.:, IV, I, 1145:
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lead balls, 22,000 pounds of powder, and 10,000 bayonets.1 4 And yet
munitions were never adequate especially in the first years of the war.
Scarcity of --gunpowder and cartridge paper foroed the Provinoials to carry
fewer rounds of ammunition than did the British Regulars during most of the
war.
Although the Committees of Safety obtained war materiel and the
militia oontinued to train, little practical thought was given to what would
happen onoe actual war began. No strategy was planned and no ooordination
of the militia under one command was considered. In the spring of 1775,
most of the people thought only of their farms and trade and perhaps relied
instinotively on the known humanity of the British Government. 15 On
April 19, 1775, actual fighting ocoUlTed at Lexington and Conoord whioh
a wakened the Americans to their crisis. As the news of war raoed through
the oolonies the Provinoial Militia of New Hampsh!re, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island hastened to Boston to aid their sister provinoe.
The quiokness in the assembling of the miliUa amazed both the
oolonists and the British. Never had there been anything like it • With the
14L1nooln (ed.), Ioumal of Each ProVincial Congress, p. 756 oited in
C. K. Bolton, The hiyat! Soldier Under Washington, (New York: Charles
Soribner's Sons, 1902), p. 105.
15Frenoh, Th! Day of Concgrd and Lexington, pp. 81-83.
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men pouring in, all parts of New England seemed to have been represented.
Most of the militia can-ied their own muskets, a number of rounds of ammunition, and a little food which their wives had hurriedly gathered. All the
clothes they had were on their backs. Patriotism was never stronger as they
encamped around Boston. This mass of militia, almost a mob, had to be
welded together into an army which would be properly fed, armed, and paid.
These troops set the pace for the colonies who responded with pleas
for men, arms, and ammunition. Massachusetts authorized 13,600 troops to
be raised, while Connecticut set its quota at 6,000 men, and a force of
2,000 was summoned by New Hampshire. 16 Artemis Ward was appointed

General of all the American Forces in front of Boston and those who were
soon to arrive.
In May, 1115, there was about 80,000 pounds of gunpowder in the

. colonies. Georoia who had recently seized 12,100 pounds of powder from a
British vessel in Savannah Harbor forwarded most of it to Boston. Massachusetts had stored up 12,000 pounds, Connecticut had 4,000, New Hampshire
had 5,000 pounds, Pennsylvania and Maryland each possessed 4,000 pounds
16wallace, OPe cit., p. 21.

9

and little Rhode Island had massed 17 ,000 pounds of powder .17 Although
New York and New Jersey possessed very little powder f the colonies had efficiently performed their task of preparing for war. However I these provisions were far from sufficient for embarking on a prolonged struggle. There
was still great need of arms, bayonets, flints, tents, blankets, and
clothing which the Committee of safety found more difficult to obtain as the
conflict approached.
By June, 1775, army life was already becoming dull with the inactivity of a siege and difficult with the shortage of rations. Soon the
troops began to grumble because of the lack of food and liquor; rum was as
essential to the army then as coffee is today. Their supply of powder and
arms continually dwindled so that by late summer there were 2,000 troops in
front of Boston without muskets and very low in powder. IS Many of the Provincials feared that the war would collapse if not because of the shortage of
arms, certainly because of the lack of gunpowder.
The Massachusetts Assembly continued in its attempts to procure
arms. On May 2 I 1775, it ordered 200 weight of lead balls and 200 pounds
17 Orlando W. Stephenson, "Supply of Gunpowder in 1116." American
Historical Review, XXX, (Jan. 1925), 271-S1.
181000 C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom« 111 5-S 3, (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1945), j>. 103.
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of powder and 1,000 flints .19 It further hoped that the artillery from Fort
Ticonderoga could soon be seized by Benedict Arnold and sent to Boston. The
individual Committees of Safety supported the military arm of the Provincial
Assemblies but they did not intend the militia to become too strong too soon
because of their traditional dread of the military spirit. Civilian leaders
were more concerned about conserving their war materiel than expending it
to win their rights. These civilian leaders feared the army's rise to power
as they recalled the Caesars and Cromwells?ho had become dlctators. Although in Massachusetts there seemed to be little unwillingness to support
its militia, there was an incident that demonstrated the friction between the
civil and military power.
Artemis Ward, General of all the assembled militia, ordered the
Committee of Safety to deliver the muskets which had been collected (with
great difficulty) by the Massachusetts Assembly. The Committee promptly
made it known to Ward that he was not empowered lito order them" but could
only order his officers. Only after the Committee had read a lecture to the
General on his military powers, did it deliver the fire arms to the militia. 20
19 lbrce , IV, II, 750-51
2°French, IJ.ut Year of the Ameriqan Revoluticm., p. 267, and Force,
IV, II, 676.
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The politicians and legislators who were sensitive to any trespassing on
their "supreme rights" were quick to keep the army in its proper place. This
same feeling would soon be displayed by the Second Continental Congress
which was to meet in Philadelphia.
The war with England had begun and the colonies in New England had
put an army into the field, but an organized army with an effic.tent system of
war supplied was still greatly needed. The Second Continental Congress had
a tremendous task before them; to agree on a Nar policy, to provide and
maintain a well-equiped army that could stand up to the British Regulars, and
to determine on a common goal that would satisfy and unify all the colonies.
The assembled militia looked to Philadelphia and its civilian leaders for
direction.

pst .

CHAPTER II
THE PEN DIRECTS THE SWORD
The Second Continental Congress convened on May 10, 1775, in
Philadelphia. Most of the members of Congress were in their early forties
or younger. Motivated by the new human philosophy of Locke and Rousseau,
their enthusiasm gave them confidence and optimism in their new developing
land. From the upper class of colonial society many of the members came to
represent their colonies. Educated and influential men like Washington, Hancock, John Adams I Duane, Rutledge ,Franklin, Sam Adams, and Dickinson
were present, and in the near future Jefferson, Gouverneur Morris, carroll,
Jay, and Henry Laurens would meet in Congress. These were the 'Irebels,"
enthusiastic, wealthy, and talented, who met to challenge the British
Empire.

21
This Congress was not like the first which had met in September,

1774. This Congress was not to be a mere advisory council. Instead, the
21Miller,

OPt

cit., pp. 21-2'1'2

13
Second Continental Congress realized the critical situation and decided to
assume the character of a governing body. Many problems had to be considered by these forty-eight Congressmen in Philadelphia. 22 Most of the
delegates were commissioned by their home governments to consider two
issues; the defense of American rIghts and possible reconciliation with
Great Britain. With New England fighting Britain, these representatives had
to decide if this war belonged to all the colonies. Some men wanted to
petition King George III that he might clearly understand their grievances
while others like John Adams felt the time for petitions was past. "Powder
and artillery are the most efficacious, sure and infallible conCiliatory measures we can adopt, " declared Adams. 2 3
Congress quickly agreed that measures of defense should be taken by
all the colonies because they thought what Britain would do to one colony it
could do to all of them. On June 10, 1775, Congress called upon the
colonies:
That it be, and is hereby earnestly recommended to the
several Colonies of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, that they immediately furnish the

22 Washington C. Ford (ed.), Journals of the Continental Congress,
(34 vols.; Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1904-37), II,
11-12. (From now on referred to as Journal.)

23 Wright, 0;. 91t., p. 91.
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American army before Boston with a s much powder out of their
town, and other public stocks as they can possibly spare;
keeping an exact account of the quantities supplied, that it
may again be replaced, or paid by the Contin!~t; this to. be effected with the utmost secrecy and dispatch.
Although they attempted to establish an adequate defense of the colonies, the
Congressmen could only recommend that their state assemblies act on the suggest10ns of Congress. Also many of the Congressmen thought the possibility
of reconciliation must remain open which was one reason for keeping their
actions secret.
The colonial legislatures responded to the advice of Congress.
Virginia i S House of Burgesses took stock of their arms, many of which had no
locks or were so old that they were useless. They resolved in mid June to
acquire arms for "protection :)f the colony against Indian wars or slave insurrections " so as not to arouse the suspicion of the royal governor. 25 So too
the Connecticut and Pennsylvania Assemblies encouraged the manufacture of
gunpowder by placing a premium on making saltpetre from materials that could
easily be obtained in the colonies. l'hese assemblies even specified the size
of muskets and fir8locks to be made. 26

26Ibid., IV, II, 563, 1172-73.

The Massachusetts Assembly not

as

15
only accepted Congress's advice to procure powder but voluntarily put itself under the control of the Continental Congress, by asking if Massachusetts could form a state government. This was a precedent since the powers
of this Continental Congress were still uncertain. Massachusetts stated that
they wanted to form a civil government since there was a vast army of militia
in their colony that had no legal civil authority to provide for them or to
govern them. 27 later in the summer Congress consented to Massachusetts'
request for a civil government. During 1775 and throughout the war New
England continued to fear the threat of military power.
The Continental Congress itself feared the thought of military power.
In early June it undertook the organization and direction of the army often
without any military knowleage. Congress drew up sixty-nine articles for
the army which dealt mostly with discipline. 28 As the war progressed the
inability of Congress to provide for the war effort became apparent and not
on a few occasions dangerous. In Congress there were no professIonal
soldiers but Congress felt the need to control all military matters.
O~

the Congressmen Washington was one of the few who had been an

officer in any war. John Adams nominated Washington for Commander-in27Journal I II, 75-76.
28Journal., II, 111-23.
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Chief of the American Forces and Sam Adams seconded the motion. Politics
and sectionalism had their influence on this military decision and indeed
would continue to plague all military operations. Congress, more especially
the New Englanders, hoped to insure Southern support in the war effort by the
appointment of a Virginia commander. John Adams strongly favored this appointment and wrote to his wife, Abigail, when Congress appointed'/vashington Commander-in-Chief.
This apPOintment will have a great effect in cementing and
securing the union of these colonies •.. I hope the people of
our province will treat the general with all that confidence and
affection, that politeness and respect, which is due to one of
the most important characters in the world. The liberties of
America depend upon him, in a great degree. 2 9
In Washington Congress found more than a mere soldier. The General
of the American Forces would have to deal with the colonial governments as
well as with Congress. Often he had to decide poliCies and manage men who
were jealous of their position and special privileges. A general was needed
who could meet the various situations, who could yield as well as insist,
and who could concede lesser points in order to gain greater ones. 30 Wash29 Edmund C. Burnett, (ed.), Letters of Members of the Continental
Congress. 1774-89, (8 vols.: Washington, D.C.: carnegie Institution of
Nashington, 1921-36), I, 130-31. (From now on referred to as Letters.)
30 French , The First Year of the Ameriqan Revolution, p. 484.
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ington accepted the appointment and promised to carry out Congressional orden. He certainly proved to be their faithful servant. His task was to unite
the existing army and to create an effective fighting force through discipline
and training.
On June 17, the Battle of Bunker Hill was fought, a costly victory for
the British Army. Already the lack of powder was felt by the American $oldiem
who had expended most of their cartridges during the battle. 31 John Adams
became an'Jry with Congress because he thought it was to blame for this defeat. He wrote Abigail that Congress had prevented every plan that might
have put the army in readiness for this attack. Further he bemoaned the delay, jealousy, and timidity that he witnessed in Congress. 32
Although Hancock, President of the Congress, continued to send requests to the colonies for war materiel, the members of Congress debated
whether the manufacture of powder was not primarily within the prerogative
of the state rather than within that of Congress. Such wrangling tired Adams,
Washington, and the military officers since they were concerned with obtaining the gunpowder, not with the one who produced it.
31 Wallace, op. cit., p. 44.
32Catherine D. Bowen, John A4ams and the American Revolution.
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950), p. 536.
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On July 3, 1775, Washington assumed command of the Continental
Army at cambridge. From his first reports to Congress, the General made
clear that his task was difficult. Not only were discipline and order needed
but military supplies were most in demand. 'Ji.,'lthout these supplies he could
not hope to put a well-ordered army in the field. Gunpowder was often
wasted by the militia who would hunt, or fire at an imaginary enemy I or
simply shoot their muskets for enj oyment. To conserve powder General
Nashington issued strict orders against such violators but these orders went
unheeded throughout the summer. In early August 'lvashington issued a
General Order to the army: "It is with indignation and shame the General observes that not Withstanding the repeated orders which have been given to
prevent the firing of guns in and about camp, that it is daily and hourly practiced." Further he admonished them that it did no harm to the enemy I wasted
precious ammunition, disturbed the camp, and added to the difficulty of
knowing a real alarm from a false one.

vVashington declared that violators

would be subjected to a court martial. 33
Powder was expended in such a reckless fashion that by early August
there was not enough to furnish the troops with one-half pound each. In June
33French. Tj1e First Year of the American Revolution, p. 469.
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the militia had about 40,000 pounds of powder on hand but as reports of the
colonial stock of powder arrived on Washington's desk, he became very
alarmed. 34 With less than 10, 000 pounds, or a reserve of not more than nine
rounds per soldier in August, Washington was expected to lay siege to
Boston. 35 The General ,Vfote to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut on August
14, 1775:

Upon the subject of powder I am at a loss what to say. Our
necessities are so great, and it is of such importance that
this Army should have a full supply that nothing but the most
urgent and pressing exigence would make it proper to detain
any on its way. 36
Throughout these months v'v'ashington wrote to the colonial governors as well
as to the Continental Congress. He soon learned that the colonies willingly
would equip their own militia but not the Continental Army.
The shortage of ammunition was so critical that the firing of the
morning and evening cannon was eliminated and the artillery was not to return British fire. Only one small nine-pounder was occasionally fired from a
vantage pOint on Prospect Hill. 36

A quarter of the army was :without fire

arms which led the officers to fear that the army was becoming useless.
34 Stephenson, op. cit., p. 273.

35Force, IV, nI, 5.
36 Ibid. I IV, III, 137.
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General Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island wrote in a letter: "Oh, that we had
plenty of powder; I should then hope to see something done here for the honor
of America ... 37 In front of Boston there was an army but it was paralyzed because of the lack of arms, artillery, and gunpowder.
Benjamin Franklin, when he heard of the scarcity of arms, suggested
to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety that pikes be used by the two rear
ranks of the army. Artemis Ward had also recommended that Congress order
the manufacture of spears to defend the American fortifications.

Washington

himself approved of spears as long as they were sturdy and thirteen feet
long. 38 Pikes and spears were not only manufactured in quantity but actually used with good effect throughout the war. 39 The General's letters to
Congress continually requested war materiel. On August 20, 1775, Washington received 61 1/2 tons of powder from the South. With this arrival he felt
reasonably safe against any attack, but he never had enough to allow an
artillery engagement or an infantry attack on the British. 40 It is amazing that
37 Ibid ., IV, IV, 312.
38Ibid., IV I

n,

1424-25.

39Lynn Montross, Rag, Tag, and Bobtail, (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1952) I p. 42.
4°French, The First Year of the American Revolution, p. 488.

p.
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General Gage never realized the plight of the American Army. Elias Boudinot
recounts an interesting explanation for Gage's ignorance.
Boudinotstated that a deserter from the Continental Army had gone to
Gage and reported the tremendous shortage of arms and powder in the American camp.
The fact was so incredible that General Gage treated it as a
strategem of war and the informant as a SPYi or coming with
the express purpose of deceiving him and dra"Ning his army
into a snare by whi<?/l means we were saved from having our
quarters beaten up.
Congress occasionally acted like Gage in that they could not believe that the
army was destitute of arms and powder.
i!v'ashlngtol1' s frequent reports were read in Congress but supplying
the army was only one of their pressing problems. In the summer of 1775,
finance, national and international diplomacy ~ and the question of independence or reconciliation were all discussed in Philadelphia. Several days after
vVashington had assumed command of the Continental Army, Congress approve
a Declaration on Taking Arms .
. . . We are reduced to the alternative of chusing (sic) an unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated ministers or
resistance by force - the latter is our choice ... Our cause is
41£11as Boudinot, TournaI, (Philadelphia: Frederick Bourquin, 1894),
pp. 71-72.
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just. Our union is perfect. Our internal resources are great,
and, if necessary, foreign assistance is undoubtedly attainable ... Lest this declaration should disquiet the minds of
our friends and fellow-subjects in any part of the empire, we
assure them that we mean not to dissolve that Union which
has so long and so happily subsisted between us, and which
we sincerely wish to see restored. 42
This Declaration demonstrates the dualism they encountered in trying to keep
the way open for reconciliation with Britain while at the same time they were
forced to prepare for war. Two days after this Declaration Congress composed and sent a petition to the King which stated their grievances and
hopes for reconciliation. Usually the army suffered most because of Congress's indecision and half commitment to war. Often discussion and debate
dragged urgent matters out for several weeks. Congressional work was long
and tedious since matters of military stores were frequently delegated to a
committee of congressmen for discussion and evaluation.

After their conside

ation the major pOints were presented to the whole Congress who then
resolved to appoint either another committee to obtain the war materiel or
merely to recommend the matter to a particular state assembly where more
committees would probably discuss the original request for military stores.
Washington wrote to Congress on August 4, 1775:
42Iqyrnal, II, 153-57.
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I need not enlarge on our melancholy situation; it is sufficient, that the existence of the Army, and the salvation of
the Country depend on something being done for our relief,
both speedy and effectual, and that our situation be kept a
profound secret. 43
This letter was read to Congress on September 1, and certainly was not acted
on until later in the month. Such delay hindered Washington's organization
of the army. This condition was not unique to the first months of the Congres
since 10s.eph Hewes of North Carolina wrote a year later:
Much of our time is employed in raising men, making cannon,
muskets, and merely finding out ways and means of supplying
our troops ... We resolve to make and import muskets, powder,
etc. but it is a melancholy fact that near half of our men,
cannon musket, powder I etc. is to be found nowhere but on
paper. 44
l

However many of the members of Congress were concerned for the
army and realized that confusion over the proper direction of the army existed.
Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, in a letter to General Washington, showed a
real concern for the army's need of supplies. On July 21, 1775, Harrison
made this observation:
Your fatigue and various kinds of trouble I dare say are great,
but they are not more than I expected, knowing the people you

----------------.-------------------------------------------------43Force, IV, III, 29.
44Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental C9ngress « (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1941), pp. 161-62.

have to deal with by the sample we have here ... Everything
that we can do here to put you in the best posture possible I
think you may depend on it. 45
V{ashington was encouraged by such remarks and continued to place his
trust in Congress I s direction of the army.
On July 15, Congress ordered the state to lift the embargo of Great
Britain \lv'hich had forbade the importation of arms into America. This VIlas the
result of long debates between Congressmen who wanted independence and
those who desired reconciHation. The greatest pressure for opening the
ports and attempting an American foreign diplomacy came from the army. \'Var
materiel was a necessity and only foreign merchants and foreign ports could
provide it. 46
Since trade was permitted with any nation that \!'lOuld supply arms and
powder in exchange for produce

I

Congress appropriated large sums of money

for the importation of military stores. On July 27, Congress

re~olved

that

$25,000 be spent for importing gunpov/der. 47 Shipmasters receiv(~d licenses
only on the condition that they would returnvvith war materiel.

Nith this

45 Letters, I, 169.
46 Curtis P. Nettels, George Wa shlngton and American Independence,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951) I pp. 226-28.
47Iournal, II, 210.
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dispensation American ships looked to Europe, Mrlca, and the 'Nest Indies
for arms and powder. 4 8 In September, 1775, Congre s s created a Secret Committee of seven Congressmen, most of whom were merchants, to supervise
the exports and imports of these important items.
From its first days Congress had encouraged the purchase of saltpetre
which could then be manufactured into gunpowder. Conqress offered to take
twelve month contracts with powder manufacturers and stated that such an occupation wa13 an honorable service to their country. 49 JUthough American
manufacturing was generally insufficient to the demands of war, powder mills
began to be constructed. In Pennsyl vClnia there were six pC'wder mills which
produced several thousand pounds of gunpowder a week which allowed the
Pennsylvania Committee of Safety to report to Congress In August that they
had a reserve of 2245 pounds of powder. 50
Congress sent letters to the colonies with information on the different
processes of manufacturing pI)lfvder in hope that they would imitate Pennsylvania. From late August and into the winter the state assemblies continued
to respond to Congress I s petition for arms and powder. Maryland resolved to
48Ibid., II, 184-85.
49~, III, 345.

so Force , IV, III,
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purchase 200 barrels of powder plus other military stores while New York
contracted for 15 tons of powder and 1400 stands of arms. 51 Pennsylvania
promised to send two tons of powder to Washington's camp: Massachusetts
resolved to purchase 30 tons of sulphur; North Carolina ordered the manufacture of saltpetre and the purchase of 550 pounds of powder, and Virginia resolved to pay

100 to promote the production of saltpetre. 52 New York even

ordered all arms found 1n the custody of those who did not pledge allegiance
to the Colony to be impressed. 53 Thus the assemblies cooperated with the
Continental Congress 1n procuring war materiel. However it is almost impossible to ascertain how many of these resolutions were really acted upon
and what percentage of the milita.."'Y stores ever reached Washington's army.
On August 1, 1775, when Congress adjourned, most of the members
set out to visit the camp at Boston instead of directly departing for their homea
Congress and the army worked very closely but at times too closely fOl' an
efficient administration of the army. General Washington knew many of the
Congressmen and could rely on their support, but as the war progressed and
new faces came to Congress Washington heSitated to rely on Congressional
51Force, W, UI, 104.

52 BWL."

w, m,

859, 1510,209, IV, IV, 80.

53DWL , IV, IU, 898.
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judgment. Some of the most talented men participated in this Congress but
Congress was an experiment in self government for the united colonies and
many mistakes would be made before an efficient system of government developed.
These men like the Provincial Congressmen saw no need for too
strong an army, especially as they were not yet committed to an all-out war
for independence. Congress protected its powers lest they slip into the
hands of the army. As a result seldom did Congress allow officers to be appointed by the general in the field. But in July, 1775, Congress left most of
the minor appointments to Washington's decisIon which displeased John
Adams. He thought the officers should be made dependent on the Congress
and not on their general for their commissions because each officer should be
a check on the general and he a check upon them. Granting this power to
Washington was unusual Since more often Congress reserved this privUege to
itself. Because of this practice many officers tried to please the Congressmen who seldom knew anything about the officer's conduct in the field. 54
This custom prevented the General from improving the organization of his
army.
54 Miller, OR. cit! ,p. 240.
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Washington was sensitive of this manifestation of Congress's
jealous fear and on occasion the General reminded them that he was a citizensoldier. On August 1, 1775 Washington was informed by Richard H. Lee of
Virginia that Congress tried to make tlhis arduous business as easy as the
nature of things would admit ... 55 Washington respected Congress and yet he
was frequently uninformed of important matters that were discussed in Congress .56 The General desired the authority of Congress to be strong in order
to keep the Continental Army together. Without a strong centralized govemment 'Washington thought the state assemblies with their own provincial interests and varied demands would destroy the army. The general never
wanted his authority to be greater than the Congress and he strove to cooperate with Congress. He was aware of their dignity and prestige and he
manifested to Congress a respectful subordination. 57
As the militia enlistments expired Washington had to order that no
soldier was to carry away his musket if it was fit for use. Although muskets
55Force, IV, IU, 1.
56John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writinqs of G!ome Wasbinqtsm '
(39 vols.; Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1931-44), IV,
52. (From now on referred to as WriUnsrs) •
57Nettels,op. cit., p. 133.
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were appraised and purchased, .nany soldiers took their leave with their
arms because they considered it their reward for service. 58 Thus Washington
had to order that "Jf any Man attempts to carry off a single Grain of Ammunition not known to be his own I he will be pursued I brought back and se17erely
punished. ,,59 Throughout the fall and winter the army remained in need of
powder and arms. Between July 1,1775 and January 31,1776, Washington
received a total of 443 barrels of powder. 60 Although this shipment could not
adequately supply the army, the General was pleased and wrote his brother,
John I in October:
I am also pleased to find that the manufacture of arms and
ammunition has been attended to with so much care. A plenty
of these and unanimity and fortitude among ourselves must defeat every attempt that the lfnistry (English) can invent to enslave this great continent.
Throughout the winter months powder vanished as fast as it arrived. Constantly Washington feared that the British Army might make an attack upon
his poorly equipped army.
58Bolton, OJ? cit., p. 113.
59 WriUnqs, IV, 283.
60DoUglas S. Freeman, George vV§shinSlton, (6 vols.: New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948-54), IV, 16.
61Foree, IV,
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As the powder shortage ,vas so great the army's artillery was practically useless, but artillery was necessary if Boston was to be recaptured
by the Continentals. Congress found it most difficult to procure any cannon.
However Washington decided. to send General Knox to Fort Ticonderoga to
bring some cannon back to Cambridge. Certainly for the present Washington
could not employ more artillery but he hoped the time would come when he
could use all his cannons. On Christmas Day the General complained to
Joseph Reed 1n a letter, "Our want of powder is too inconceivable. A dally
waste and no supply administers a gloomy prospect. ,,62
Although powder and arms were scarce and the situation seemed
critical, food was fairly plentiful around Boston. Thus with food rather than
with fire arms Washington kept the British Army locked up in Boston that
winter. 63
When Congress reconvened in September, 1775, it continued its debates over the purchase of military supplies. Some of the members who still
favored reconclliatton were opposed to purchasing large amounts of milItary
~2Ste!,henCl'f)n, op. cit q
Washinaton, III, 215.

63wallace, oR. cit"

p. 274, quoting Sparks (ed.) Letters of
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stores while others like Duane remarked, "We must have powder; I would
send for powder to London or anywhere. \Ve are undone if we have not
powder. ,,64 Delay was inevitable during these debates but it seldom seemed
to worry the Congressmen. In some of the debates sectionalism was evident
as Congress argued what colony should get a certain contract and what price
that colony should be paid by the united colonies. 65 On occasion Congress
was embarrassed by having to compete with states in the purchase of private
cargoes of arms. Also there were always profiteers who did as much damage
to the army and Congress as any British force.
On September 29, 1175, Congress appOinted a committee of three of
their own members to visit the army camp at cambridge in order to plan the
most effectual method to continue to support and regulate the Continental
Army. The instructions approved by Congress for this committee reflected
their own ignorance of military affairs. The Committee was supposed to 1nform Washington of Congress's hopes for an attack on Boston in the near
future. 66 After ten days of consultation with the General the Committee returned to report to Congress on November 2, 1115. In their report methods of
64Iournal, III, 484.
65llUsL,
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supply, the size of the army, pay of officers I and the discipline of the army
were discussed, but no mention of any attack in the near future. 67 After
Congress heard the report they discussed most of the issues which were
slowly approved in conformity with Washington t swishes.
However, Sam Adams voiced his fear of the possibility of

is

military

dictator if the "general's army" became too independent of Congress for its
needs. Sam Adams wrote to Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts that the Continental Army must be under the direction of Congress and the military power
of the colonies should remain under the direction of the individual state assemblies unless Congress should demand such authority. Gerry was essentiaUy in agreement with Adams in his reply:
vVe already see the growing thirst for power in some of the

inferior departments of the army, which ought to be regulated
so far as to keep the military entirely subservient to the civil
in every part of the United Colonies. 68
In late October, 1775, Adams still felt that military power "has so often

proved fatal to the liberties of mankind" that unless the militia became the
backbone of resistance to England, the ColOnies were in danger of losing
67

!l21sL, ,W, 321.

68 Burnett, op. cit., p. 107.
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their liberties to some aspiring general wearing the Continental Army's
uniform. 69
A letter similar to Adams' viewpoint bad appeared earlier in PhUadelphia under the title I 9aractacus on Standing Armies. "Beware of standing
armies ••• a knowledge of the use of arms is the only condition of freedom ••••
The Romans conquered the world in the Republican times with armies of unpaid
militia. ,,70

Some members of Congress really distrusted the power of the

Continental Army as a standing army because it was paid while others realized
that the militia alone could accomplish very little

Fortunately there were

enough Congressmen who supported Washington's opinion that the army must
be well supplied and paid. Although division of feelings remained in

Congres~

Lynch I who was a committeeman that had been sent to Washington, wrote to
the General on November 13, 1775: "I am happy to inform you that Congress
has agreed to every recommendation of the committee. It 71
Congress was not opposed to the army but a number of Congressmen
feared the army or simply tried to oversee too many military operations. There
69John C. Miller I Sam Adams, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. I 1936),
p. 344, quoting Writings of Sam Acitms I III, 230.
70Force, IV, III, 219-20.
71 Letters I I, 253.
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was gradually less talk of reconciliation as Ward of Rhode Island wrote to his
brother in the middle of October, 1775: "In a word all hopes of a speedy reconciliation are over, and we unanimously determine to push the war with the
greatest vigour. 1.72 Congress was still far from any decision to break completely with Britain in a declaration of independence, but with less talk of
reconciliation Congress would attend to the war effort more energetically.
Congress continued to be slow to delegate any of its authority to military personnel. It also would try to control both the civil and military affairs of the
United Colonies. Thus the shortage of war materiel would continue partly
because of Congress t s own incompetence to administer both the army and its
own legislative body efficiently.
The deficiency in arms and powder was so acute that Washington was
prompted to begin his own negotiations to acquire such military stores. On
three occasions the General had wanted to attack Boston but his council of
war opposed him because of the powder shortage and the troops' lack of expedence . 73 By the end of 1775, French merchants had arrived in America and
had gone to Congress with their proposals for selling war materiel. 14 By
72Burnett, op. cit., pp. 115-16.
73Writinqs, IV, 405-07
74 Nettels, op. cit., pp, 229-31.
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November the troops had only five rounds of powder a piece and the artillery
was silenced while Washington was forced to wait and hope.
The depression was somewhat lifted when news came that a Captain
Manly, a privateer, had captured a British brig, the Nancy, in late November,
1775. The ship's cargo contained 2,000 muskets, 100,000 flints, over 30
tons of musket shot 30,000 round shot and a brass mortar which the soldiers
I

I

later named '1 Congress. ,,75 By January, 1776 part of this shipment of military
stores had reached Washington, and Colonel Henry Knox arrived at Cambridge
in February with the much needed artillery of Fort Ticonderoga. During
February Washington had to dismiss militia who reported for service without
arms, and frequently soldiers would go out on the ice in front of their camp to
pick up spent balls that the British troops had fired at them. 76 Stephen
Moylan, an aide to Washington, wrote at this time: 'IIf we had powder I do
believe Boston would fall into our hands ... 77 The situation was stUI critical
when Washington informed Congress of the state of his supplies on February
18, 17i6:

7 5Dr. James Thacher, MilitarY TournaI During the American Revolutionary War, (Boston: Richardson and Lord Publishers, 1823), p. 33.
76Freeman, op. cit., IV 19 quoting Baldwin, Journal, pp. 25-26.
I

77Ibid., quoting Letters of Reed, I, 160.
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This, sir I Congress may be assured is a true state of
powder (between 60 and 1000 barrels) I and will, I hope I
bear some testimony of my incapacity for action in such
way as may do any essential service. 78
By the end of February, however, powder and arms were arriving at
the camp especially from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. 79
In late February Washington thanked Governor Trumbull of Connecticut for gunpowder from his reserve, and in early March the General thanked Joseph Reed
for his efforts in Congress to obtain arms. In the letter Washington remarked,
"I feel too sensibly the mortification of having them (arms) withheld from me;
Congress not even thinking 1t necessary to take the least notice of myapplication for these things. ,,80 Washington's patience often helped him to overlook
these slights but that he did feel them is revealed in that letter to Reed. On
the twenty-ninth of February three tons of powder arrived at New York and
three more were expected. Most of this powder went directly to Washington' s
army.81 Somehow General Gage never did learn of the true state of affairs in
the American camp and in March the Continental Army's artillery bore down on
78 Force, IV , IV, 1193
79Ib1d ., IV, IV, 968, 970, 1477 and Writings, IV, 343, 433.
80 Writings, IV, 365.
81Force, IV I VI 83, 100
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the British troops . Washington made good use of his artillery in front of
Boston, but throughout the war American artillery was inferior to the British.
Washington and his officers felt confident enough to attack the British forces
but poor weather intervened and on March 17, 1776, the British evacuated
Boston. In their great haste the British left great piles of shot shells, and
I

other munitions. Even the cannon had been spiked so poorly that many of them
were restored to usefulness. 82 Washington and Congress for the first time
in months could be proud of the army. 'ntis army of half-trained provinCials
had withstood its first test against the British Regulars as well as it withstood
Congress's ineffiCient system of supplies

There were still many more tests

to be encountered both by the army and Congress.

82 Montross, oR. cit., p 89.
<

CHAPTER III
CONGRESS AND THE DIClATORSHIP
Throughout the new year of 1776 , Congress continued to try to purchas
war materiel. John Hancock I President of the Congress, requested several
state assemblies to make an estimate of available arms and powder in their
military stores. Whatever war materiel the states could procure Hancock
thought should be furthered to the Continental Army. Thomas Lynch of South
Carolina mentioned in a letter to WashIngton that Congress had ordered fifteen
tons of powder from New York, and that there was enough saltpetre in Philadelphia to produce another eighty tons of gunpowder. 83 In January Congress
was informed that only 462 quarter casks of powder had been imported which
was hardly sufficient since Congress supplied powder to individual colonies
in need, the army in Canada I and privateers, as well as the Continental
Army.84
83Letter! ' I, 314.
84Force, IV, IV, 1645.
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John Adams wrote James Warren to encourage Massachusetts to produce powder from saltpetre since it had worked so well in New York Maryland,
I

and Pennsylvania. 85 By the end of March 1776, most of the colonies had provided legislation for the erection of both public and private saltpetre works
which benefitted the state militias and the Continental Army. The state assemblies tried to cooperate with Congress in obtaining military supplies. The
Committees of Safety made contracts with local gunsmiths and blacksmiths to
produce muskets and bayonets. On February 23, Congress created a committee of five Congressmen to make contracts and to consider ways and means
"of promoting and encouraging the manufacture of Fire-Arms in all parts of the
Colonie s . 1.86
It was futile to hope that most of the arms and powder could be produced within the colonies. As the colonies were chiefly agricultural they were
not prepared for a long war and were forced to look abroad for most of their
military stores. The values in supplies is seen in the contracts these Committees of Safety made with the privateers. At the beginning of the year 1776,
a Maryland Committee wrote to Captain Forsythe:
85!tWL, N, IV, 1141.
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The money arising from the sales, you must layout in gunpowder if you can get it, if not, muskets fitted with good
bayonets and if they are not to be had, saltpetre and sulphur,
and if you cannot get those articles, then layout the whole in
strong coarse linen. 87
I

I

On March 3, 1776 the Congressional Committee of Secret Correspondence
wrote to Silas Deane who was in France that they hoped he could acquire
"arms for 25,000 men, suitable quantity of ammunition, and 100 field
pieces ... 88 Although Congress worked to procure arms for their military arm

I

frequently they wasted too much effort and time in lengthy discussions and
mismanagement. Early 1n March Hancock informed Washington that the importatton of war materiel was so dangerous that Congress had appointed a committee to contract only with colonial gunsmiths for the purchase of arms. The
letter concluded:
I flatter myself we shall soon be able to provide ourselves
without risk or danger. Because we must, like other States engaged in the like glorious struggle contend with difficulties.
By persevereance, and the blessing of God I trust, if we continue to deserve freedom; we shall be enabled to overcome
them. 89
I

Had not military stores comes from abroad it is doubtful if the colonies would
87 Ibid., IV I IV I 771.
88Letter., I, 376.
89Porce, IV, V, 83.
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ever have won their freedom. The colonies certainly did not become selfsufficient in the matter of war matedel.
When news of the evacuation of Boston reached Congress they were
too busy to really appreciate the event. Joseph Hewes on March 20, 1116
wrote of Congress:
We do not treat each other with that decency and respect that
was observed before. Jealousies ill natured observations and
recriminations take the place of reason and argument. Our
tempers are soured. Some among us urge strongly for independence and eternal separation, others wish to wait a little
longer a~~ to have the opinion of their constituents on that
subject.
I

The members of Congress began to irritate one another. Congressmen were
swamped with work and had little time for rest. Although committee meeting s
often began early in the morning and continued late into the night, they were
a1 ways behind in their work, no matter how long or how hard they labored.
The health of some Congressmen broke down under the strain. lohn Adams
wrote that the management "of so complicated and mighty a machine as the
United Colonies requires the meekness of Moses, the patience of Job and the
wisdom of Solomon, added to the valor of David ... 91 There were simply too
90Burnett, 0D' cit., p. 141.
91 Page Smith, lohn Adams I (2 vols.: New York: Doubleday and Co. ,
Inc., 1962), p. 241.
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many tasks, too many committees, and not enough representatives.
During the winter months only twelve or fifteen members were present
but with the spring more members would attend. For some, this was a way to
preserve their health. Much of the work they left behind secretaries could
have done but Congress relied only on its own members. No wonder such a
body of men could not properly supply and direct an army of 14,000 under
General Washington. They were not willing to make matters easier for themselves by assigning to Washington more authority. Even in the midst of their
important discussions on independence and a possible declaration Congress
held on to the power to control all military deCisions. It seems that they were
Just too distrustful of the army to surrender any of their own powers.
However, one of the most conspicuous failures of the Congress during
the war was their inefficiency in organizing and supplying the army. Different factors contribute to this failure. Congress I s distrust of the army and
their ignorance at military operations, the frequent change of Congressional
personnel, and the lack of any strong centralization of authority all added to
the distress and confusion of the army. Officers and soldiers complained
about the civilian interference of Congress in their affairS. The military personnel felt the civil authority should appoint capable men to command the
armies and then allow them to fight the war. They thought members of Con-
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gress only made it harder to win the war. General Nathanael Greene, a close
friend of Washington I protested acidly against a system that made men of the
sword "subJeot to the censure and reproach of every dirty little politician ignorant of every circumstance necessary to form a right judgment ... 92 Greene
later in the war became a quartermaster-general which he undertook because
he and Washington felt that a soldier must do the job if it was to be done
properly.
Congress ordered the General to attend its assembly in late May,
1776, in order to draw up plans for the ensuing campaign. 93 'Washington then

had the opportunity to report the needs of his army in person to Congress.
Throughout April and May, arms were still in great demand but the shortage of
powder was not as acute as it had been in the winter months. Earl1erWashing
ton had written to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island that "in this Army ,altho' I
have pursued every mode I could devise for procuring them (arms), their (sic)
1s still a great deficiency and a considerable number of Men without any in
their hands. 1194 In like manner the General had written to the Assembly of
Massachusetts to request a shipment of musket balls, and to Hancock he had
92 Miller I Triumph of Freedom, pp. 84-85.
931oWDII, IV, 385.

94Writing,. IV, 414.
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written on April 25,

II • • •

the Deficiency of Arms is very great ... Can Congress

remedy this evU? if they can, there should not a Moment be lost in effacing
it as our strength at present is in reality on paper only; ..• 1 hope Arms may be
procured. ,•95 Thus ~Nashington had much to say to Congress when he arrived
in l\1ay. Congress listened to the General but it did not realize the impact of
his remarks.
Washington with two other generals and thirteen Congressmen discussed the plans of the army. After a few weeks of discussion Congress
granted Washington' s request that a Board of War be instituted to supervise
the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments. However the Board consisted of five members of Congress who were stUI burdened with other demanding tasks within Congress. 96 Only through disavpolntments and Inefflciencies would Congress learn that its own members could not manage all the
assigned committee work. Within a year or two they wOIJld realize that no
group of men whose main concerns were legislative and political was prepared
to plan and conduct a war. 97
95lIiWL, IV I 518.
96IournaL 'N, 399-401.
97Burnett,
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On his return to camp near New York, Washington continued to inform
the President of Congress of his military needs especially of lead and flints
and occasionally powder. 98 Throughout the summer 'vVashington was almost
over zealous in his orders for the protection of gunpowder. As the General
realized the importance of ammunition and how easily the troops wasted it he
took every necessary precaution. Frequently he ordered that whippings or
court-martials be given to soldiers found wasting powder. 99
In August, 1776, Hancock told Washington that

t'"NO

ships, one of them

captured by a privateer, had arrived with military stores. All the cargo on
board these ships, Hancock prOmised would be sent to the Continental Army •
Privateers greatly aided Congress in supplying the army. The FraQklin in early
summer had captured the British ship, !l22!t, and brought it into port with 1500
barrels of powder, intrenching tools, and gun carriages. 1 00 These privateers
usually were COmmissioned by state assemblies or the Congress itself to capture whatever military supplies they could. However, there were speculators
who had little scruple in raising prices on private cargoes of munitioI)s.
98 Wr1t1nas, V, 19.
991tW;!., V, 60.
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These men took advantage of both Congress and the army by profiting from
their hardships. Washington considered these profiteers as the "murderers of
our cause" who should be hunted down, and "I would to God that one of the
most atrocious of each state was hung in Gibbets upon a gallows five times as
high as the one prepared by Haman. ,,101 Washington and Congress had no
sympathy for these speculators who sacrificed the Uves of the army and the
rights and Uberties of the united colonies for their own selfish gains.
During the summer as the supply of gunpowder increased Congress became concerned over the complaints about the quality of the powder. Congressmen already too busy took on another task of investigating the powder,
produced and purchased, for its quickness in firing, dryness, and strength.
Finally in August, 1776, Congress appointed inspectors to do this testing but
this was not matter that should need the decision of Congress. 1 02 This kind
of work belonged to the army but Congress could not distinguish the minutiae
from the maj or decisions.
Between May 6, and June 14, 1776 fourteen ships arrived from the
\llest

Indies with a total of 100,000 pounds of gunpowder and many stands of
101M1l1er, Triumph of Freedom, p. 454.
1 o2Journa 1, V, 714.
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fire arms. Another twelve ships were expected with a cargo of 10-12,000
pounds of powder .103 As these supplies arrived they were slow to reach
Washington I S army. On July 6, Congress informed the General that Scotch
transports had arrived at Massachusetts and Rhode Island and that Congress
had authorized the cargoes to be sent to the Continental Army. Washington
then wrote to Artemas \tVard on July 9, and requested that these supplies be
immediately sent. By late July Washington probably had some of these
military stores. 104
During this summer there were still soldiers without arms which led
',;Vashington to continue to request the state governors and the Congress for
aid. In late summer ships were still bringing powder and muskets from the
\iv'est Indies but there is no way to ascertain how much of these military stores
reached the Continental Army. Besides Congress's slowness to designate the
place where arms should be sent, such supplies did not always arrive. On one
occasion Hancock wrote to an officer that he would overlook the offense,
" ... but with respect to the Arms order'd by Congress to be
sent Genl. Washington, and which Mr. Glover mentions he
without consulting you had dispos'd of among the Troops, in
I

103 Force, V, I, 265-66.
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his Brothers Regiment, I must insist that you immedlately carry
that resolution into Execution, and that the Arms be forwarded
to the Genl. as as first order'd by Congress, it being my Duty
to see every Resolve of Congress executed ... "105
This instance of mismanagement was frequently repeated by other officers in
charge of magazines.
Washington was patient with Congress in their mismanagement of
supplies but he became impatient when Congress would not let him manage
the officers of his own army. Washington complained to the Board of War that
he could not appoint officers to fill up his vacancies without the approval of
Congress. On August 2, 1776, Hancock repUed to the General that
Should Congress ever empower its Generals to fill up Vacancies
in the Army, they knew of no one in whom they would so soon
Repose a Trust of such Importance as in yourself: but future
Generals may make a bad use of it. 1 06
The President of Congress concluded that the danger of such a precedent prevented Congress from allowing this power to Washington although he might
exercise this power with the "greatest public Advantage.

II

Once again Con..·

gress's fear of military power is seen and how it hindered Nashlngton IS
command.
I o5 Letters , II, pp. 25-26.
106Wrltingi, V, 349.
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"Support the army and that will support the government.

"ithout ...

all will fall together. ,,101 This aphorism of General Greene was not accepted
by many members of Congress who continued to distrust the army. This distrust of military officers and the fear of too strong an army is one of the chief
reasons for the army's deficiency in military stores. Congress tried to
adequately equip the army but because of this fear Congress was not ready to
allow the army to care for itself. Congress still relied too much on the volunteer militias. Congress's indecision as to the aim of this war also hindered
its support of the Continental Army.
In the summer of 1116 there were three part1ee withi'1 Conl]resp. Ftrst,
there were the conciliationists who were the smallest group I consisting
approximately of nine members who wanted self government and autonomy
within the British Empire. Such men a s Dickinson, Jay, Duane, and Robert
Livingston belonged to this party. lOB Then there was the militant party made
up of Sam and John Adams, Franklin, Jefferson, and another fourteen Congressmen. Since they favored independence they thought an all-out war was
necessary. 1 09 Finally there were the moderates who were the largest group
101 Miller, Triumph of Freedom. p. 55B.
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l09Ibld., pp. 106-01.
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consisting of Philip Livingston, Joseph Hewes "Villiam Hopper, aobert
I

Morris, Hancock, Silas Deane, and others. They favored the support of war
short of independence. All three groups were united in their defence of American rights and in their fear of a strong military rule. 11 0
This fear of the military is reflected in two documents that were drawn
up

that summer. First it is seen in the Virginia Bill of Rights, June 12, which

stated that " ... in all cases the military should be under strict subordination
to, and governed by, the civil powers. "Ill By July 2, the majority of the
three parties in Congress agreed that the colonies must be independent of
England to protect their rights. This meant the war-effort must be fully supported without hesitation by the Congress of the United Colonies. Nevertheless in the Declaration of Independence which climaxed the Congressional
;,vork of 1776, it is charged against the King of England that he rendered "the
military independent of and Superior to, the civil Power. 11112
Most of these Congressmen as civilian leaders had given birth to the
idea of revolution in America which grew and matured in the public meetings
110

_
Ibid., pp. III 1.2.

III Samuel E. Morison, Sources and Document: American Revolution,

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 151.
112Iournal, V, 495.
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and assemblies of the colonies, the committees of correspondence, and the
committees of safety. 113 In general there was a fear of any exec uti ve power
that was too dominant or dogmatic. Some of these leaders felt the cause of
liberty was safe only in their hands. Now the revolution was no longer an
idea but a war and many of these same leaders were suspicious of the new
class of men emerging as leaders t the generals. Sam Adams still said the
colonies were in danger of "losing their liberties to some aspiring general
wearing the uniform of the Continental Army. ,,114 Sam Adams never lost this
fear as he proposed that the only way the Congress could avert their Caesar or
Cromwell was by keeping the generals securely in their own control and to
make the general the instrument of their own sovereign will. Washington's
patience and patriotism seldom lessened with this Congressional attitude of
distrust. In a letter to Joseph Reed the General wrote, "I am not fond of
stretching my powers; and if the Congress will say. 'This far and no farther
you shall go,' I will promise not to offend whilst I continue in their service. "lIS Washington continued to support Congress and obeyed their orders
as well as their requests faithfully although it must have been trying at times.
113 Miller, Triumph of Freedom, pp. 239-40.
114Miller, SgmAciams, pp. 344-45.
115Montross, op. cit., p. 241.
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Congress could not directly order the army in the field beuause of the
distance between the two groups but Congress could send committees to the
army. Congress insisted not only on its theoretical but also its practical
superiority and dignity over the army. Congress never forgot that it had organ.tzed the army, directed its officers, occasionally planned its strategy.
summoned its generals to their assembly, and countless other small details.
Thus Congress extended its control ovel" the army by sending these committees
to camp but they seldom could approve or order anything for the army while in
camp. They were mere observers and messengers for Congress. Had these
committees possessed more authority they could have saved the army from delays in awaiting decisions from Congress. Congress would retain the administration of the army until the winter of 1777 when they appointed military personnel to the Board of War. For the present army management must continue to
suffer while Congress dallied in military matters. 116
Not until July 2, 1776, when the English fleet arrived at New York, was
\'Vashington sure where the English army would next attack. In August the size
of the Continental Army increased from 17 ,225 to 27 I 000 which was the largest

&:mx.,

116 Louis C. Hatch, The Administration of the _[!£tn Revolytlonary
(New York; Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904), p. 110.
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American force brought together under a single command during the war .117
However the colonial troops were still outnumbered by Howe's army of 32,000
men. Vvashington realized how indefensible New York was but he felt the
Continental Army was not sufficiently trained or adequately supplied to attack
tile British. In early September he conveyed this idea to Congress who
needed to be educated in war tactics.
In deliberating on this Question (defense of New York) it was
impossible to forget that History, our own experience, the advice of our ablest Friends in Europe, the fear of t.l}e Enemy, and
even the Declarations of Congress demonstrate that on our Side
of thevVar should be defensive ... That we should on all Occasions avoid a general Action I or put anything to the Risque, unless by a necessity I into which we ought never to be
drawn •. ,118
On August 27 I 1776 the

~ttle

of Long Island began and the struggle

around New York continued until November when Washington's army dwindled
to 3,000 soldiers in retreat. The Continental Army which several times could
have been crushed were led in a good retreat by their able General.
New Yorkers decided to take down all the bells in the different
Churches and public edifices in their city that they might be made into cannon.
117Wallace,

OPT

cit., p. 105.

118John C. Fitzpatrick, George \/\iashinsrton Himself I (Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. I 1933) I p. 251.
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So too they melted wtndow and clock weights kitchen utensils, und even a
I

statue of King George for musket balls ,119 New York City fell to Howe's
forces on September 15, 1776 as'./I/ashington escaped with 13,000 troops up
to the '. Vhite Plains above ilie city,
Continually Vvashington's General Orders during this campaign demonstrate his need and concarn for ammunition. On September 17, \,'}ashington
stated that regiments who had expended their ammunition should be immediately supplied, but he was vexed

~hat

soldiers still wasted powder by unneces-

sary firing .120 vVashington also warned the officers to take the greatest care
of the arms and ammunition in bad weather . In the middle of October the
Board of War added to the General's difficulties since they wanted the immediate return of some ordnance stores, General vVashington replied that it
was impossible to furnish such a return while the enemy was so near, "As
large quantities are constantly in demand in time of war, he (VV'ash!ngton) does
not conceive your provision in these instances can be too great. "121 Occasionally Congress was more concerned for its own protection and for the
119Force, V, II, 184.

120\lIlrttinas. VI, 90, 124, 192.
121Ibid., VI, 222.
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conservation of military stores than for the army's defense and the expenditure
of military stores in waging war. And yet Congress cannot be completely
blamed as they probably did not knON the critical situation that faced the army
On October 28, the Battle of 'lihUe Plains was fought in which Howe's
20, 000 troops defeated the Continental Army but Washington once again so
commanded his forces that they escaped across the Hudson River. More disasters still awaited the American troops on Manhattan. On November 15, Fort
viashington was captured and four days later Fort Lee fell to the British. 3000
men 146 cannons, more than 12,000 shot, nearly 3000 small arms, and 400,00
l

cartridges Illlere lost to the enemy.122 Some powder hact been saved from Fort
Lee which Washington informed Congress. In his report he added that the loss
of the soldiers will be severely felt "but when that of the Arms and Accoutrements is added, much more so, and must be a farther Incentive to procure as
considerable a Supply as possible for the New Troops, as soon as it can be
done. 1I123 As Washington retreated into New Jersey, Congress became alarmec
at the failure of this campaign.
Josiah Bartlett 'Wrote to a fellow member of Congress that "I am sorry
our affairs at New York have succeeded so badly. Vve want a regular, well
,U:Zf'orce, V, III, 1058-59.

123wriUnqs, VI, 287.
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disciplined army, more experienced Generals. A regular army we must have,
at all events, against another year. ,,124 For the first time many in Congress
saw how ill prepared 'L'leir army was for battle with experienced and well.3qulpped British RegulaI S • President Hancock, himself, requested longer enlistments,
..• give me leave to observe that to make m€m well acquainted
with the duties of a soldier, requires Time: and to bring them
under proper subordination and Discipline, not only requires
time, but has always been a work of much difficulty ... as the
time of their dischurge approaches, they l;Jrow careless of their
arms, ammunition, etc. I and impatient of all Restraint .125
Finally Congress seemed to have heard what Washington had reported.
Washington had warned Congress of short enlistments but his words had fallen
on deaf ears. The General wrote to his brother that he had pointed out the evil
.consequence that result from short term militia •
The consequence of which, you have had great bodies of
militia in pay that never were in campi you have had an immense quantities of provisions drawn by men that never rendered you one hour's service (at least usefully) and this in the
most profuse and wasteful way.1 26
124Porce, V, II, 1459-60.
125Leqers, II, 99.
126Writ1ngs, VI, 137.
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In the winter of 1775-76, V.'ashington had thought short enlistments would be
the waste of arms and ammunition cmd the ruin of the army. In December, 1776
the army was still in great need of arms and powder because ',Vashington in
his own hand wrote to ConiJres::i that many of the militia:
threw' their Arms away I some lost them, whilst others deserted
and took them along. In a word, altho' I used every precaution
to preserve them, the loss has been great, and this will forever
be the ~,se in such a Mixed and irregular Army as ours has
been. l
'rhe General thought a regular army would end this .vaste of arms and ammunition since the militia had been "the origin of all our misfortunes and the great
accumulation of our debts. I! 12·8
The states as well as Congress must be blamed for this fear of the
standing army. Although Congress gradually realized that battles could be
won only by experienced and well supplied troops, the bogey of a standing
army and the fear of military power still influenced many of the Congressmen.
This fear seems to have been too ingrained in their traditions and background.
Perhaps history would repeat itself, too many members thought. However Congress persevered in their attempts to procure war materiel and even requested
127 Ibl.r!:, VI, 406.
128Porce, V, III, 1311.
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the states to lengthcrl their enlistments. The state aS3embl1ps cooperated
but continued to suppcrt their own militias over the Continental Army.
One member of Congress

I

Edward Rutledge

I

'.:Vfote to John Jay at this

time that Congress posses3ed its share of hclman weakness; the way members
allo'JI their attention to h3 engrossed by subjects which c(.luld have been post-

poaod while others require ::!espatch instead of neglect. 1.29 Minutiae as well
as personal disputes frequently slmved the work of Congreos to the detriment

of the army and of the united oolonies.
During November and December much needed arms and ammunition arrived from Prance by way of the -"/est Indies. Silas Decme who was in Paris
even sent 100 barrels of gunpowder by way of Amsterdam ,130 At this time too,
Deane recommended Congress to deal with a Frenchman I Beaumarchais, under
the name of Hortalez et Compagnie in purchasing war materiel. Deane hoped
that a treaty of some kind would soon be arranged with Prance that could
lessen the shortage of arms and powder. He even suggested to Congress that
they
... engage a great general, of the highest character in
Europe •.• to take the lead of your armies, whether such a step
129 v\<-rltinas, VI, 246.
130Porce, V, III, 512, 596, 1050, 1371, 1436.
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would not be politick as it would give a character and credit
to your military I and strike, perhaps a greater panic in our
enemies. 131
I

Congress does not seem to have seriously considered this, As the arrival of
these ordnance stores from France came to the attention of Congress

I

usually

they ordered them to be sent to the Continental Army as soon as possible
situation was too critical for

Congres~3

to delay,

The

If the army was defeated this

'illinter the cause of the United Colonies Nas also defeated,
In mid December as the Nar situation began to look desperate ( Congress decided to flee Philadelphia for Baltimore. Before their departure on
December 12
that 'I..

I

Ui1til

Congress enacted a nnst extrctordin::ry resolution.

It stc1ted

th.e Congress shall otht'!rvvise order, General ':'Iashington be

possesse6 of full pOiler to order and clin;ct all things relative to the department and to the operation :.>f war .. ,132 The ideo. of delegating such authority
.vas finally approved because Congress :;ne\'I1

'''a~l:dngton

must be ab3.8 to act

immediately without a \vaiting their decisions.

Other/vise thE:yhole aim. Df the

revolutIon I l:berty and self government J,.V0u 1d

')8

of a possible

di~tatorship

I

0 Vl1

fear

Four days after this dec.ist::m\obert t!iorrisvr::>te

to Congress:

131Ibid.

sacrificed to th21 4'

V, III, 901, 1089.

132Iournal, VI, 1027.
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In short, if the Congress mean to succeed in this contest, they
must pay good executive men to do their business as it ought to
be, and not lavish millions away by their own mismanagement,
because no man living can attend the daily deliberation of Congress and do executive parts of business at the same time .133
In supplying as well as directing the army Congress had to risk delegating
their authority and sharing their responsibilities if they hoped to prevent further mismanagement of the war effort.
On December 27, Congress e.'h"tended v'.ashington's powers for six
months and specified more clearly what his powers were. The main powers
were concerned with the care of the army but he could also exercise martial
law. 134 Only a week prior to this, .vhen the General VITote to Congress to
petition them for power to promote soldiers in the field, he said:
It may be said that this is an application for powers that are
too dangerous to be entrusted. I can only add that desperate
diseases require desperate remedies; and with truth declare,
that I have no lust after power I but wish with as much fervency
as any man upon this wide-extended Continent for an opportunity of turning the sword into a ploughshare .135
Washington, himself, must have thought it strange that Congress should en1 33 Porce, V, III, 1241.
134IournaL VI, 1045-46.
135Porce, V, III, 1311.
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trust him with so much power but it was the opinion of many Congressmen that
it was absolutely necessary.
liilliam Hooper wrote to Robert Morris that Congress had endowed
'dashington with I'large povvers " and that the business of war will novv be in
the IIproper channels and the Congress be no longer exercised about matters
Nhich it is supremely ignorant ... 136 Whipple vvrote that itvvas "thought absolutely necessary for the Salvation of America. ,137 Finally Benjamin Rush
stated in a letter that "General,iashington must be invested with dictatorial
power for a few months or we are undone. The vis inertiae of the Congress
has almost ruined this country. ,,138 Congress trusted their3eneral partly because they had no other choice but defeat.
During these last feN days in 1776, Congress revealed the locations
of the powder magazines to ',.8shington and informed him that he had full
access to these supplies. If he thought it necessary he could increase the
size of the army and appoint officers. Congress even .vrote lJashington 'L"lat
they flere happy that this Country had a General Nho could be entrusted -vith
136Letters, II, 196.
137Ibid"

II, 198.

138 Force, V, UI, 1487.
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such "unlimited Po Ncr and neither personal 38curity liberty, or property be
I

111 the least degree endangered thereby. ,,139 So it seems thativhen on the

brink of disaster Congress who so often feared the powers of the c::aesars and
the Praetorian Guards imitated the old Roman Senate and created a temporary
dictatorship.

139.!12i.!L, V, III, 1618, and Letters, II, 198.

CHAPTER IV

VALLEY FORGE: DESPAIR AND HOPE

dashington's victory at Trenton on December 26, 1776, renewed Con~ress I s

hopes and encouraged all the colonies. Certainly it was not an over-

whelming victory but it came at a time when the cause of liberty seemed futile
and lost to many. The srnall army struck the British again at Princeton on
January 3, 1777, and turned back the British troops

Although this was more

a skirmish than a battle it proved to the British that the Continental Army had
great recuperative ability and must be reckoned with.

""ashington then led his

soldiers to Mon'istown for winter quarters where he attempted to reorganize,
train, and better equip his army.
vvhile in winter quarters ""vashington issued an order under the jurisdic
tion of his dictatorial powers. He stated that all those in the area around his
camp who had subscribed to Howe's declaration of pardon must take an oath of
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allegiance to the United Colonies or leave for the British lines. 140 (:;ongress
Nas disturbed by the General's exercise of his pOi,ver because they thought it
Nas an infringement on the civil rights of the states. Congress I s concern refleets their fundamental distrust of General

'ashington's power, the very

pONer Nith 'Nhich they entrusted him.
Th::-oughout 1777 Congress urged the colonial assemblies to supply the
army with military stores.

Congress cttempted to cooperate with the army as

Nell as they could but they were disturbed by too many other problems. In

late January Congress orderedji 8shington to send 94 tons of powder to
General SchUyler who commanded the army in New England .;;\/ashington could
not fulfill this request since he had no more powder than was necessary for the
immediate consumption of his own army,141 Although 'vashington kept Congreas regularly informed, they seldom communicated important matters to
their Commander-in-Chief. Prom February to April Nashington's letters reflect his concern for military stores, He feared that powder was a great deficiency in all the colonies since many state assemblies v,rere wTiting to him

140 Fitzpatrick op. cit., p. 285.
.
I

"

141 vvritin9''§', VII, 70.
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requesting ammunition ,142 In a letter to the Massachusetts Assembly
General \IVashington stated that:
Nothing distresses me more than the Universal Call that is
upon me from all Quarters I for Fire Arms I which I am totally
unable to supply, The scandalous Loss, waste, and private
appropriation of Public Arms, during the last campaign is beyond all conception ,143
As the General could do little to procure arms at least he hoped to prevent such
great loss and waste of public arms, He ordered that "United States" be
stamped on all the weapons and that the muskets in need of repair be not discarded but fixed. 144 The loss of five to eight thousand muskets a year in the
Continental Army led Congress in February to request the colonies to purchase
all the arms of private persons who had no immediate need of their fire
arms ,145 In March, 1777 I Washington sent a circular to the Ne',., England
assemblies and personally wrote a letter to the Governor of Connecticut,
Trumbull, to cooperate witb this request of Congress ,146 At times Congress
142.!!lliL, VII, 169.
143Ibid , VII, 208-09.
144 Ibid., VII, 340-41, 358.
145Montross, QP. cit., p. 270
146Jsmrnal, VII, 119, and Writings, VII, 230.
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was as unable as the General to procure arms since they

cou~d

only request

the state assemblies to cooperate with their demands.
V\/ashington complained to Congress that his enquiry about the amount
of military stores on hand had not been answered.

\Vhen two and three

states were completely unrepresented in Congress delay was inevitable.
Samuel Chase complained to his

ONG

Maryland Committee of Safety that:

It is not only necessary to be represented, but be assured the
Business, the Interest of these States require a full Representation. vve have not thirty Members in Congress, and it is not
only improper, but impossible, for so small a Number to conduct so very important Business ,147
Under such circumstances Congress continued to do its best in the procurement of war materiel,
Washington's concern and worry about war materiel was reduced when
he received word of the Mercury's arrival at Philadelphia. The Mercury, one
of Beaumarchais' supply ships, brought 11,000 muskets plus other needed
military stores. Most of these muskets were from the French royal arsenals 148
Congressman vVhipple remarked that the arrival of this vessel "is the most
lucky circumstance that could have happened,' and John Adams wrote to James
147Letters, II, 229-30.
148Charles VV. Sawyer, Firearms in American History, (2 vols.;
Boston: Charles N. Sawyer, 1910L p. 113, and TournaI, VII, 211.
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Warren that, liOn how many Occasions when We have been unable to see any
Way to help ourselves has Providence sent us an unexpected Relief. Thus it
has been, and thus it will be ... 149 Congressmen as well as army officers rej oicedover

this cargo.

On April 20, 1777, another French ship, the Amphitrite, docked at
Portsmouth with 12,000 muskets and 1000 barrels of gunpowder. After this
Washington remarked to Governor Trumbull that "we shall have no further complaints for the want of arms. 1,150 Congress was confident too, but ·Washington
immediately urged them to appoint someone to direct all these military stores
lest confusion and ill consequences result. 151 The General also hoped that
these supplies would be moved inland to prevent any quick naval attack by the
British navy. One ship, the Seine, which Congress awaited was captured by
the British .152 However during the remainder of the summer, 1711, French
ships carrying war materiel purchased with Beaumarchais I aid, continued to arrive at New England harbors. Most of these arms and ammunition went to the
149 Letters , II, 310.
150 Writings, VII, 334.
151JJ;Wl., VIII, 2-3, 7-8.
152 Ibid., VII, 216, 330.
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army in the North but Washington must have received some of them. John
Adams who was on the Board of War wrote to Warren in late March, 1777 I that:
There is no danger of our wanting Arms or Ammunition for the
future - between six and seven hundred Barrells of Powder
having arrived in Maryland, and indeed, We have plenty of
Powder before. In short, my Friend, although We have many
gdevousthings to bear, and shall have more; yet there is
nothing wanting but Patience .153
France generously aided the American cause long before any formal treaty or
alliance was made

Through the efforts of Silas Deane Congress was secretly

negotiating with France and hoped France would soon declare openly in favor of
the colonies.
Somehow arms were scarce again in April when Congress stipulated that
the states must arm their soldiers before they were sent to the Continental
Army. The army had no surplus of muskets and there was a shortage of cart1 4 '
ridges. 5 Washington ordered that the troops' arms and ammunition be
regularly inspected so that the soldiers could account satisfactorily for any
deficiency or pay for it .155 On June 10 and 20, 1777, the General wrote that
the army could use any spears that might be stored in the armory, and he
153Letters, II, 313.
154Iouroal, VII, 315 Cited by Freeman, op. cit., IV, 631.
155Wdt1nqs, VII, 391.
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specified the way he wanted 500 spears to be made for his "Horse and Light
Foot ... 156 In a reply to a letter of Governor Trumbull Washington apologized
that he could not supply him with any arms as there was hardly a sufficient
supply to meet the demands of the Continental Army. What amazed Washington
was that the late importation of arms outnumbered the Continental troops raised
to use them. "lhese have not and could not have been all put into their hands;
and yet there are very few of them (muskets) now to be fOUlld undisposed
of. ,,157 In this same letter the General told the Governor to supply the Continental troops with arms rather than the militia because he could order the
Continental Army more quickly to a trouble spot than a governor would send his
militia. Friction between the army and militia still existed and this was most
felt in regard to supplies.
The war effort was further thwarted as state assemblies would pay high
bounties in order to raise troops for their militia. Washington found it difficult
to enlist men to whom Congress paid minimal wages. John Adams realized that
these short term militia could not win the war as he remarked that "We shall
never do well until we get a regular army and this will never be until men are
156WsL" VIII, 222,. 272.
157l2!sL, VIll, 334-35.
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enl1sted for a longer duration. ,,158 This meant that Congress must grant more
generous bounties and better pay. Congress was reluctant to do this but if the
war was to be won Congress and the army and the colonies had to cooperate
and compromise.
Thomas Burke of North carolina informed his Governor that within Congress "all particular jealousies are for the present laid to sleep I and long and
uninterrupted may their slumber be. We are more wisely employed in giving
vigor to our military operations and in correcting abuses in our departments ....,159 If harmony existed between the members of Congress, it did not
yet exist between Congress and their army. Washington wrote to Governor
Trumbull that he did not know where Congress had sent some of his new troops
which had upset his plans. 160 From time to time Congress would order soldiers
to a town or arsenal without informing the Commander-in-Chief. In June, 1777,
Washington wrote Richard H. Lee, a Congressman from Virginia t that he had received no answer to a request of his:

II • • •

and this being frequently the case,

leaves me often in a very disagreeable state of suspense, from which a simple
158 Smith, op, cit., pp. 287-88.
159 Letters , fi, 325.

160WritiQSls, VIII, 43-44.
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yea or nay would relieve me ... 161 Congress lost in their own work continued to
test the patience and loyalty of their General.
Muskets were still a serious problem in July as John Adams informed
'Warren that although 18,000 arms had arrived at Portsmouth, he did not know
what became of them. Other arms had also arrived in Massachusetts but Congress had no idea where they had gone .162 Washington feared that the arms
quickly vanished due to the carelessness of his officers and the mismanagement of Congress. Thus he reported to the Board of War that a set of arms
would be as necessary as a new suit of clothes each year .163
Towards the middle of July, 1777, a committee from Congress arrived to
confer with the General and on August 5, they reported to the whole Congress
that the army needed not only arms but also food and clothing. 164 There were
serious problems in the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments. In the
past Congress had so interfered with these two departments and had so bound
their hands that in August the Commissary General, Joseph Trumbull, resigned
161Ibid., VUI, 160.
162Letters, II, 404.
163writ!ngs, VIII, 388.
164Iournal, VIII, 546, 608-15.
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and in October, Thomas Mifflin, the Quartermaster General resigned. Although
"Washington reminded Congress frequently of the need of these officers for the
very existence of the army no new apPointments were made. This committee
made known the need of a better organization within the army for the location
of food and military stores but Congress took no immediate action. The army,
not Congress, would suffer for this failure.
The shortage of powder was no longer so severe. By the fall of 1111 ,
the colonies had imported 1,454, 210 pounds of gunpowder, had locally produced 115,000 pounds of powder from saltpetre, and had made 698,245 pounds
of powder from 418,250 pounds of imported saltpetre. The total amount of gunpowder in the colonies was then estimated at 2,261,455 pounds. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania made the largest contributions to this quantity of
gunpowder. 165 Ninety per-cent of this powder came from Prance by way of the
West Indies. The crisis of gunpowder had passed but the Continental Army
would never be as fully supplied as the British Regulars. Together Washington
and Congress had accomplished this difficult task.
The army remained in need of arms. Washington ordered that all discarded arms should be collected and repaired. Soldiers often were issued a
165Stephenson, 02 cit., p. 211.
t
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new musket because no gunsmith was in camp who could fix the old one. 166
By the end of the summer the shortage of food and clothing became a graver concern to Congress and their General than their musket shortage.
Military and civil affairs grew worse in September when Washington was
forced to retreat from Brari(jywine. In this battle the army contained nearly a
thousand troops without muskets. 167 Vifashington had hoped to defend Phlladelphia from Brandywine but his troops were outflanked by the British. Although
the Continental Army retreated in good order, they left behind some artillery.
Shortly afterwards on September 18, 1777, Congress quickly fled from Philadelphia and on September 27, General Howe marched triumphantly into the city.
The dignity of Congress had again been ruffled as they were forced to leave
their city comforts. Congress blamed Washington and the army for the indignity and physical inconvenience which they suffered. They so easUy seem to
have forgotten that the condition of the army was partly due to their own
muddling incompetency. 168 Before Congress departed for York Pennsylvania,
I

166Writings, IX, 18-19.
167Rufus Lincoln, Papers. 1776-178Q, James Minor Lincoln (ed.),
Private Printing, 1904), p. 10.
168Fitzpatrick, op. cit., p. 312.
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it invested 'Washington with dictatorial powers for sixty days .169 Only when
everything seemed beyond hope did Congress trust "Vashington and his
seeming "military might." Congress delegated this power to the General because it seemed to be the lesser of two evils; defeat or dictator.
Congress J s confidence had been shaken during this military crisis in
which the army could only retreat. Congress accepted the advice of Washington and appointed a new Board of War made up of military personnel. But Congress sacrificed any immediate hope of harmony between the Board of War and
the army by choosing adversaries of 'Washington. Gates, Mifflin, and Conway
made up the Board. The members of Congress seem to have intended this as a
system of checks and balances.

170

Congress could not understand \Vashington' s continual retreat maneuver
but the General had one aim, to win the war. The only way possible was to
fight a war of skirmishes, avoiding any major engagements unless the odds
were heavily in his favor. He

h~'d

to keep his army together and strong enough

to harass Howe's forces but an aU-out attack would quickly put an end to his
army and the war. While Washington did not prefer this kind of war, he
realized it was the only kind of war his army, often impaired by the shortage of
169Igurnal, VIII, 751.
170 M111er , Triumph of Freedom, p. 254.
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military stores, could engage ih at the present. Congress did not yet appreciate this military insight .171 Some Congressmen thought vVashington was too
hesitant to be an effective general.
Since Howe's forces were split and Washington was tired of Congress's
complaints of inactivity, he decided to attack the main British force at Germantown. On October 4, 1777 foggy weather brought confusion to the inexperienced troops of the Continental Army and Washington lost the effect of his
surprise attack. The army was prevented from any further attack because of
the scarcity of powder .172 The attack, however, was not completely in vain
because it reinforced Howe's conviction that the Continental Army had a lot of
fight. Both armies then settled in their winter quarters - the British at
Philadelphia and the Americans at Valley Forge.
During the winter of 1777, the relations between Congress and the army

became more strained. 'Washington who considered himself the servant of Congress

reporte~

regularly by letters to Congress, but frequently he was kept in

the dark by Congress not only of civil matters but also of military. It seems
that Washington was told nothing of the forthcoming French Alliance by Con171 Fitzpatrick, ?p. cit., p. 297.
172Wrltings, lX, 477-78.
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gress .173 Members of Congress thought it best that the possible alliance be
kept a secret from the General despite the protest of Henry Laurens who was
then President of Congress .174 Perhaps the Legislators were too busy to keep
vVashington informed, but it is more likely that Congress wanted to remind the
General that he was subordinate to them and must depend on them for whatever
information they wanted to make known. Washington began to mistrust some of
. the Congressmen whom he felt were working more for their own selfish purposes
than for the common welfare of the united colonies.
In late October Congress celebrated General Gates' victory over
Burgoyne at Saratoga as the news had just reached them . Washington wrote to
General Putnam that liThe defeat of General Burgoyne is a most important event,
and such as must afford the highest satisfaction to every well affected
American. ,,175 News of this victory gave a powerful impetus to an attack
against Washington which became known as the Conway Cabal. To some Con173Force, V, II, 839, and V, III, 1437.
174Miller, Triumph of Freedom, p. 243. I have found nothing in my
research to substantiate this claim of Miller except a few remarks in Force,
V, II, 839. At the same time I found no evidence to deny it. My proof rests
with Miller who gave no references to primary sources.
175William S. Baker, ItInerarY of General 'Nashington, (Philadelphia:

J. B. Lippincott Co., 1892), p 99.
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gressmen t..'Ile Commander-in-Chief had accomplished almost nothing except a
seri3S of failures. Sam Adams felt that Continentals must fight the British to
the finish and could have defeated the British bad there been an energetic campaign in the fall of 1777 . 17 6 Conway who sought his own promotion wrote to
General Gates in early November that "HGaven has been determined to save
'lour country or a weak General and bad counsellors would have ruined it. ,,177
This clearly implied that Washington was that IIweak General". The Congress
wanted a General who won major victories and now they had one in Gates.
Linked with Sam Adams were Mifflin, James Lovell, Benjamin Rush and even
Richard H, Lee who thought a New England General was needed to win the war.
Secttonalism was still prevalent in Congress. There were secret conferences
but little is known about the plans of these Congressmen except that they expected Washington's resignation to be soon given to Congress .178 For a
time 'Washington's recommendations went unheeded as Congress hesitated to
give him their full support. On December 30. 1777, lafayette wrote to his
General:
17 6 Miller , Sam Adams, p. 348 I quoting Warren-Adams Letters, I, 278.
177 Baker. op. cit., p. 104.
178Letters, III, 267.
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There are open dissension in Congress; parties who hate one
another as much as the common enemy; men who, without
knowing any thing about war, undertake to judge you, and to
make ridiculous comparisons. They are infatuated with Gates,
without ~inking of the differences of circumstances, and bel1ev
that attacking is the only thing necessary to conquer. These
ideas are entertained by some jealous men, and perhaps secret
friends of the British Government I who want to push you, in a
moment of ill humor, to some rash enterprise upon the lines, or
against a much stronger army.179
Washington was well aware that Congress was opposed to his "Fabianism but
II

he refused to be pressured by them against his better military judgment. He
answered Lafayette's letter the next day:
For it is well known I that neither ambitious, nor lucrative motives led me to accept my present Appointment; in the discharge
of which I have endeavoured to observe one steady and uniform
conduct, which I shall Invariably pursue, while I have the honor
to command, regardless of the Tongue of slander or the powers 0
detraction .180
Massachusetts and Virginia as a whole refused to turn against Vlashington but it was not until mid summer 1778, that vVashington regained Congress's
confidence. The General felt it was his duty to remain with the army until he
was dismissed by Congress. In January he wrote a friend, Reverend William
Gordon:
179 Writings, X, 236.
180 Ibid., X, 237.
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So soon as the yublic gets dissatisfied .vith my service or a
person is found better qualified to answer her expectation, I
shall quit the helm with as much satisfaction, and retire to a
private station with as much content as ever the wearied pilgrim
felt upon his safe arrival in the Holy-land .181
V/ashington was sensitive to the dissatbtaction within Congress and
was "exceedingly hurt with these Observations and hard speeches" but he was
determined not to resign .182 The jealousy and intrigue of this cabal furthered
the estrangement between Congress and Washington's army during a time of
great need, Valley Porge.
Valley Porge became a tragedy because the arnlY was in the midst of
pler;.ty or very near to it but could not share in it. There was no shortage of
food in the colonies and }'et food did not reach the army because of the greed
of farmers who insisted on hard cash for their produce. Also the transportation
system with the army was completely tangled and confused. In reality the
Quartermaster Department did not exist while Congress failed to do anything
oxcept discuss new plans for a Quartermaster Department. The problem of
supplying the army was now as serious as it had been a year ago. On December 23 ,Washington addressed Congress in a long letter on the needs of the
181 ~,
1
X, 3 38.
182Boudinot, op. cit., p. 52.

80

army and on their responsibilities to the army:
I can assure the gentlemen that it is much easier and a less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a
good fin:~side, than to occupy a cold I bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and
distressed soldiers, I feel abundantly for them, and from my
soul, I pity those miseries which it is neither in my power to
relieve or prevent. 183
In the same letter WashIngton told Congress that the "army can do three

things, starve, dissolve, or disperse. II
Some of the Congressmen opposed to Washington seem to have blinded
Congress to the pressing needs of the ragged army. This is evident from a
letter of 'Washington to Robert Morris in which he complained that he seemed to
have failed to make completely known the true state of affairs in camp since
Congress thought "it is but to say, Presto BegoI'Q and everything is done. ,,184
Occasionally Congress almost believed that it was the duty and privilege of
the soldier to suffer for his country. Lafayette remarked "these veterans have
patience in their misery which is unknown to European armies ... 185 This could
18 ~ .... flUng s, X, 196.
184Alfred H. Bill, Valley Forge: the Making of an Army, (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952), p. 12.
185Miller, Triumph of Freedom, p. 499.
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as well have been said of Vlashington. while Congress discussed the food and
clothing shortage, foreign ofHcers in the Alnerican armv were reported to have
said that no other government than a republic would have inflicted such unnecessary suffering upon its defenders .186
As officers would no longer make excuses for thAir legislators the army
began to complain and spoke of Congress with contempt ,187 'Nashington
warned Congress that there was a pOint beyond which the patience, fortitude,
and loyalty af the troops could not be driven. If the army this winter did not
reach that pOint it was mostly due to their General. Vlithout strong leaders the
army would have fallen to pieces. The cause of liberty, alone, cannot stir men
to valor when food, clothing, and arms are lacking, but a personal loyalty to a
commander can strengthen men in their determination. The very thing that Congress feared

~nosti

the army's loyalty to its general rather than its nation, it

forced upon the army

<

Congress had given Washington pov!er to impress supplies from the
surrounding countryside but he was slow to act because he knew colonial resentment vi the military power. The farmers no less than the Congressmen
186Hatch, op. cit., p. 223
187 Ibid., p. 94, quoting Joseph Clark, "Diary," New Jersey HistOrical
Society Proceedings, 1st series, VII, 104.
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detested a military dictator. Although \.IVashington had to impress supplies and
wagons he feared that he would make more enemies than friends among the farmers. He was so concerned about the use of this power that he r.;;quested Congress to let the states use their civil authority to impress the farmer's supplies
since:
The people at large are governed by Custom, To Acts of Legislation or Civil Authority they have been ever taught to yield a
willing ob~dlence without reasoning about their propriety. On
those of Military power, whether immediate or derived
originally from anothfA Source, they ever looked with a jedlous
and suspicious eye. 8
On several occasions Congress urged the General to exercise this power of impressment but he was sensitive to the friction between military and civil
authority, and thus rarely used this authorization. Besides, the soldiers were
seldom either well-enough or adequately dressed to travel outside the camp for
any impressment of supplies. 189
Though there were many opponents of Washington in Congress who were
loud in their criticism, there were also many who were concerned with the
welfare of the army and who valued Washington . Congress resolved in late
November to send a committee to camp to devise ways to supply the army and
188;/1"iti1195 « X, 1 S~ •

189Thacher,

OR.

cit., p. 153.
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the best means of carrying on the next campaign" At the beginning of the new
year, 1778, another

was authorizeq by C.ongress to

comrnitte~

~"isit'l/ashington

at Valley Forge .190 '!'he first c'?mmittee remained in camp all winter, and due

to either misunderstanding or ignorance frequently antagonized the officers.
On the other hand the vt$lt1ng

comrnittee~

often were sympathetic to the army

and would represent the army's grievances in Congress .191 By means of these
and othet committees Congress attempted to keep in touch with the army and
perhaps more closely direct it.
At the time Congress extended Washington's extraordinary powers, it
also resolved that one month's extraordinary pay be given to the troops for
"their soldierly patience, fidelity, and in zeal in the cause of their country. II
COllgress further assured the soldiers that it was trying to remedy their
grievances by better direction of the Commissary Department .192 Congress
tried hard, but this was not qood enough as Hamilton remarked, "In what Con<;Jress had at any time done for the army, they h.ave been commonly been too
190Iournal. lX, 972.
191 Montross, op. cit., p. 242.
192

Burnett,

2P.::....cl~ '.' p.
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late ... 193 Certainly this was most true of Valley Forge.
Congress attempted to supply the army but often provisions on the way
never reached the camp or could not be shipped from the depots because of the
scarcity of wagons and horses. During the winter of Valley Forge Washington •s
correspondence constantly mentions the need for clothing, food, and transportation. Likewise Congress' s IOUJ'!lA1 records the orders of military supplies.
Congress was sympathetic to these needs but they were utterly unable to relieve them because of the inefficiency of the Quartermaster and Commissary
Departments. Congress was deceived by some profiteers and speculators who
had no concern for the army.194 There was graft I speculation I selfishness I
and even some meaness, but gross mismanagement strained Congress's relations with the army and caused much needless privation and worry. Gradually
Congress realized that it could not oversee all the duties it had assumed. Con
gress decided to share some of these responsibilities with men who were not
members of Congress. Nathanael Greene, a close friend of Washington and a
soldier I perhaps could organize the Quartermaster Department. On March 2,
193Allen Bowman, The Moral' of the American Revolyt1onary Army,
(Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public AffairS, 1943), p. 93,
quoting Hamilton, Writings, I, 168.
194 Wallace, OR. cit., p. 169.
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1778, Greene was appolnted to the post of Quartermaster General by Congress .195
Added to the army's problem of suffiolent food and olothing was the deficlency of muskets whlch still concerned Washington. In late December and
again in January several ships an1ved with arms, gunpowder, musket balls,
saltpetre, and some cannon. 196

Washington congratulated the army on their

arrival and oonsldered these French ships as proof that France was well dtsposed towards the colonies. The General maintained discipline throughout the
winter as well as he could with a ragged and half starved army that frequently
deserted for a period. General orders stipulated that the soldiers' ammunition
must be examined carefully each day at roll call to prevent the waste of any
powder.

197

When Baron von Steuben arrived on February 27, 1778, he described
the army he saw encamped at Valley Forge:
The arms at Valley Forge were in a horrible condition, oovered
with Nst, half of them without bayonets, many from which a
single shot could not be fired. Th. pouches were quite as bad
195Iguma1, X, 210.
196Writ1nqs, X, 181, 202.
197~, X, 358-59.
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as the arms. A great many of the men had tin boxes instead of
pouches, others had cow homs; and muskets, carbines, fowling
pieces, and rifles were to be seen in the same company. The
description of the dress is most easily given. The men were
literally naked; some of them in the fullest extent of the
word. I98
On March 28, Congress appointed von Steuben Inspector General of the Army
which post he served excellently. He enforced a rugged discipline in his
training throughout the spring, 1778, as new recruits came into camp.
Despite the privations and frustrations Congress caused the army, a
well-equiped and well-disciplined ConUnental Army emerged from Valley Forge
in June, 1778. The equipment and food had been supplied by Quartermaster
General Greene who accepted his position only if he was not hampered by Congress. Congress slowly learned the advantage of the centralization of
authority as it allowed Greene his desired freedom of action.
Most of the soldiers had a musket and bayonet in which he had a new
confidence because of Baron von Steuben' straining. Before the Baron' s instructions, the Continentals seldom relied on their bayonets as few knew how
to use them well. John Laurens wrote to his father, the President of Congress,
in early April that:
I must not omit to inform you that Baron Steuben is making a
sensible progress with our soldiers •.. If Mr. Howe opens the
198Baker,

OR.

Cit., p. 123, quoting Kapp, Life of Steuben.
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campaign with his usual deliberation, and our recruits or
draughts come in tolerably well, we shall be infinitely better
prepared to meet him, than ever we have been .199
All the soldiers were equiped with knapsacks, cutting swords or tomahawks,
cartridge pouches I and American flints. The army was st111 Without uniforms
but they wore a Itrifle dress" which was a hunting shirt, long breeches and
leggings, a dark hat decked with a cockade or green twig, and a white belt
over their shoulder for their cartridge pouch. 200
The hardships and difficulties endured together at Valley Forge gave the
troops a new bond of union. Congress through its mismanagement and seeming
indifference, nevertheless, had welded together an army under the skilful and
faithful direction of General Washington. The situation looked much brighter
in this spring of 1778 as Washington and von Steuben placed their confidence in
these soldiers who were hardened veterans, the core of the Continental Army.
The army still had to be tested under fire but Washington waited for Howe to
make the first move. As summer approached Washington hoped that a better understanding and cooperation between the Congress and 1ts military army could
be achieved.
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CHAPTER V
THE CRISIS IS PASSED

In the early spring of 1778 Congress's attendance improved as the
legislators returned expecting to piok up business where they had left it the
previous winter. Henry laurens, distressed by this cavalier attitude, wrote to
James Duane who had been absent from Congress since December, 1777:
What representation had ye for upward of three precious months,
when those things were done which ought not to have been done,
and those left undone which ought to have been done? ... seldom
15 to 17 (members) made a very full House - you well know Sir,
the unavo~g!ble drudgery of Committees requires more
hands .•.
Laurens had every right to oomplain as Congress accomplished most of its work
in committees which depended on a full representation of the colonies.
Necessary decisions frequently had to wait. This spring Congress hoped to reorganize the army especially in the commissary department and to improve the
financial status of the United Colonies.
201 Burnett, OR. cit., pp. 319-20.
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On April 7, 1778, Congress agreed to make a Contract with
Beaumarchais' s Roderique Hortalez et Compagnie for arms, ammunition,
clothing, and other military stores, Within a year after this agreement
Beaumarchais sent eight shiploads of war materiel valued at five to s1x million
livres to the colonies, 202 Congress was relieved by Beaumarchais's successful efforts to supply the Continental Army.
In this same spring of 1778, General Washington was displeased with
Congress as it would neither increase the pay of his officers nor grant them any
kind of pension after the war. As a result some of his officers were resigning
when the General needed them most. Vvashington revealed his feelings about
the army and Congress in a long letter to John Banister who was a delegate from
Virginia. However, VVashington seems to have intended that the letter be read
by other Congressmen too:
We must take the passions of Men as Nature has given them, ani
those prinCiples as a guide which are generally the rule of
Action. I do not mean to exclude altogether the Idea of Patriotism. I know it exists, and I know it has done much in the
present Contest. But I will venture to assert, that a great and
202Edward S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778,
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1962), p. 79, quoting ~Vharton, I, 60, and
Journal, X, 316-21.
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1a sting war can never be supported on this principle alon~. It
must be aided by a prospect of Interests or some reward. 03
Washington, unlike some of the Congressmen, was a practical man, He
realized that political philosophy or the ideal of independence was not sufficient to keep his soldiers in the field.
Washington continued in this letter to compose his thoughts in a manner
that was rare in his correspondence. The small number of Congressmen present
and their limited talents concerned the General. "I wish our representation in
Congress was complete and full from every State, and that it was formed of the
first Abilities among us. Whether we continue to War, or to proceed to Negotiate, the Wisdom of America in Council cannot be too great ..... 204 Washington like Laurens wanted all the states represented by qualified men so that more
work could be accomplished by the committees. The army was very dependent
on Congress for its supplies and the General understood this as well as any
Congressman.
Washington concluded this long letter to Banister with two more observations. The indeciSion of Congress which he never became accustomed to,
was the first. Laurens himself was aware of this problem and once wrote to
203Writipgs, Xl, 286.
204Y&L, Xl, 289.
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Washington that " .• 'tis seldom in the power of the President to answer with
that dispatch, which may seem necessary ... ,,205 The President of Congress
also realized that "precious time was lost" and Charles Garroll remarked in
this April of 1778, that "The Congress does worse than ever: We murder time,
and chat it away in idle impertinent talk: However, I hope the urgency of affairs will teach even that Body (Congress) a little ciiscretlon ,,206 Congress
did not always realize the army's need for urgency.
The second observation made by the General was

that~

The jealousy which Congress unhappily entertains of the Army,
and which, if reports are right, some Members labour to establish. You may be assured there is nothing more injurious, or
more unjustly founded. This jealousy stands upon the common,
received Opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly
true, that standing Armies are dangerous to a State. 207
He continued that most nations had found fault with standing armies in time of
peace since they consisted of "mercenaries and hirelings" but not in time of
war. The General looked upon his men not as mercenaries but as paid citizen
soldiers. Washington wrote, "We should all be conSidered, Congress, Army,
etc., as one people, embarked in one Gause, in one interest; acting on the
20 5Letters I II, 549.
206Burnett, op. cit., p. 317.
207WrWngs, Xl, 289.
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same principles and to the same end. ,.208 "Vashington was concerned that
Congress so feared the army and was opposed to a standing army. Militia
alone could not win the war. The army, Washington realized, must be subordinate to the supreme civil authority of the nation but this did not mean that the
army became the slaves of Congress. As an ex-Congressman, GeneralVVashington understood that these "jealousies" would only injure the cause and war
effort of the United Colonies. Thus he concluded his letter in a defense of
his soldiers:
It is unjust, because no Order of Men in the thirteen States have
paid a more sanctimonious regard to their (Congress's) proceedings than the army ... it may be said that no history, now ex
tant, can furnish an instance of an Army's suffering such
uncommon hardships as ours have done, and bearing them with
the same patience and Fortitude. 209
Congress realized that they had made mistakes and in April they began
to discuss the army especially after their winter at Valley Forge. Debate over
an increase in pay for the officers lasted until May 15, 1778, when a proposal
was passed. The debate centered about whether officers should receive halfpay for life. Some Congressmen argued that it was. not in the power of Congress to enact such a measure while others feared a standing army would
2081Q!sL ,
209.!!WL, Xl, 290.
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result. A compromise was reached in May when Congress resolved that halfpay be awarded t.lte officer for seven years instead of life. 210 This compromise satisfied both the army and Congress.
The scarcity of arms and ammunition still perturbed the General as he
awaited action by the British Forces. He informed Congress of his need for the
coming campaign:
I shall not add upon the importance of this subject or apologize
for giving you this trouble, as you are so well acquainted with
the real, as well as accidental expenditure of ammunition in the
course of a Camrign, and the fatal consequences attending a
scarcity of it. 21
Washingtonls orders continued to be strict in regard to the loss of gunpowder.
He prescribed thirty-nine lashes for any soldier found wasting ammunition. 212
DiSCipline was necessary for the army's survival.
Congress listened to the Commander-in-Chief's petitions and tried to
provide the needed war materiel. According to Samuel Chase, Congress had on
hand in late April, 15,000 muskets and 200 field pieces. 213 Congress
210Burnett,
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informed General Gates, Commander in the North and the favorite of som.e of
the legislators, that on no account was he to stop the supplies destined for the
main army. Also the "hero of Saratoga 1/ was told that no expedition should be
undertaken without Nashington I s approval and that all requests for soldiers
should likewise be approved by the General. 214 Congress had forgotten the
Conway Cabal, This was the same Congress that had preferred Gates over
Washington last winter but the rumors and jealousies against Washington no
longer were given much attention. On April 23, 1778, Congress even manifested their confidence in Washington by extending his plenary powers until
August 10.
'Washington learned of the French Alliance from another general, Alexander McDougall, who had received the news from Simeon Deane. Deane, the
brother of Silas, had recently returned from France to deliver the actual treaty
to Congress which he did on May 4. 215 Congress quickly ratified the treaty.
It seems that Washington had no official information from Congress that an alliance might be agreed upon in the near future, but he overlooked the slight and
rejoiced that France had formally come to the aid of America. 216 However John
214JoUI'Ml, X, 368.
21 5Wrlt1nag, XI, 332.
216112!sL, XI, 288.
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Laurens, Washington's aide, "l'lI'ote to his father that it was not proper that the
General of the Army should be so poorly informed of all that is knowl1 by C011gress of European affairs.
Is lt not a galling circumstance, for him to collect the most important intelligence piece-meal, and as they (Congress) choose
to give it, ... it should be considered that in order to settle his
plans of operation for the ensuing campaign, he should take into
view the present state of European affairs and Congress should
not leave him in the dark. 211
The President of CongreR£ answered his son that he was not ignorant of his
son's complaint and that he was ashamed that Congress was so slow to entrust secrets to their commander. Once before, but to no avail, Henry Laurens
had rebuked Congress for their withholding information from Washington. 218
The French Alliance was celebrated on May 6, in Washington's camp at
Valley Forge. A salute was given by firing first thirteen cannons, and then eacli
soldier fired three rounds and the artillery discharged forty-four cannons. 219
Powder could be expended since a French Alliance would mean more arms, artillery, powder I a whole army, and a navy. V{ashtngton could feel reHeved
211 Letters, III, 228.
2181!lliL ,
219Elijab Fisher, Journal, (New York: reprinted WilHam Abbott,
Magazine of History, 1909), p. 19.
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because what Congress could not supply, perhaps, France could. Actually
French supplies were no greater after the treaty than before due to
Beaumarchais's tireless service to the colonies between 1776-1778. 220
With the summer campaign very near in the middle of May 'Nashington's
letters continually mentioned the need of arms. Although General Knox informed the General that 2,000 muskets were on tbe way to him, Washington
asked for another 1000 as a "number of men are intirely (sic) destitute ... 221
The General also urged Congress to see that the arms and clothing expected
from France were sent to the army as soon as they arrived.

"Our distress is

amazingly great" he reported as recruits came into the camp without muskets.222
Frequently other generals requested arms of Vlashington since they thought Congress would best supply the Continental Army. But he was helpless to aid them
as he wrote to General Smallwood on May 19, 1778,
The scarcity of arms with us is so great, that I can at present
afford no relief to your wants in this respect. I am employing
every means we have, to collect SW'llies and shall furnish you
as soon and as amply as possible. 3
220Charles Van Tyne, "French Aid Before the Alliance of 1778," American Historical Review, XXXI, (Oct. 1925), 20-40, p. 20.
221 Writings, XI, 409.
222 Ibid., Xl, 416.
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Occasionally 'Nashington was frustrated by having his orders

countermand~;;d

and the military stores he had expected from Springfield, Massachusetts would
never arrive.

III

early June he was still making last minute preparations byob-

taining pistols and swords for his officers. 224
On June 18, 1778, Sir Henry Clinton, the new Commander of the British
Forces, evacuated Philadelphia and began his march towards New York. As
Clinton's baggage train was very long, his army took seven days to march forty
miles. 225 The Continental Army marched out of Valley Forge on June 19 and 20
in pursuit of Clhton. On !une 28, 1778, the Continental Army attacked the
British near Monmouth COllrt Houss but Genera:, Lee panicked and ordered the
army to retreat. The retreai was not a rout and the battle lasted all day thanks
to Generals 'lVashington, Knox, Greene, and '/layn3 and Von Steuben's well
trained troops. This was the first time that tIle army displayed steadiness and
maneuvered tactically under British fire. During the night Clinton and his
troops, exhausted after the day's fighting, co.1t1nued their march to New York.
This battle wa's not an Americnn victory but the Continentals had proved themselves ,both to Congress and iNashington. Slovlly,Nashington continued his
224ll2!9..:, XII, 27.
225Miller, Triumph of Freedom, p. 318
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pursuit of the British. He set up his own camp on the White Plains where two
years earlier he and his Continental Army had fought the same British Army. 226
On August 3, 1778 the General wrote to Congress in praise of Quartermaster General Greene for performing his duties well. He informed them that
Greene had made possible his quick mobility with the whole army from Valley
Forge until he camped at White Plains. 227 Most of the Continental Army would
remain in the New York vicinity for the next three years while the main theatre
of war would shift to the South.
Throughout the fall and winter General Washington tried to obtain arms
for his troops as there was a considerable deficiency. Washington WVed Congress to send cargoes that arrived from the West Indies and France to Springfield, Massachusetts ufrom whence the Articles may be brought to the Army as
they are wanted . .,228 cannon was another defiCiency within the army, and now
that the army could perhaps lay siege to New York it would need more artillery.
In late November, 1778, Washington wrote Congress:
The providing of cannon is a matter of infinite importance and I
am persuaded Congress will take every means in their power to
226Fitzpatrick, OR. cit =, pp. 353-55.
Fisher, 9p. c1t., p. 22.
22 7Baker, 9p. cit., p. 140.
228Wrttinas, XlII, 311.
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accomplish it ... we cannot extend our views too soon to the obtaining a further large supply. We must in the course of things
have occasion for a great deal of Artillery. 229
However the Continental Army was always weak in artillery and depended
heavily on French Artillery •
The army made winter quarters near West Point while Clinton's forces
remained in New York. In December Washington indicated to Congress that he
desired to attend their meeting to inform them personally of the state of the
army and what was needed to continue the war. Congress ordered the General
to come as soon as practicable to Philadelphia. On December 24, Washington
announced his arrival to Congress. Although the General had made known his
desire to visit Congress, they could not simply let him come but thought the
initiative should appear to have been taken by Congress. Thus in the Journal
of Congress civil power indeed was supreme over the military as it is written
that the General "persuant to their orders appeared before Congress. 2 30
II

When men like Sam Adams still feared the army, no wonder Congressmen were "j ealous" of their power. In a letter to James Warren, Adams wrote,
The time may come when the Sins of America may be punished by
a standing Army; and that Time will surely come when the Body
229Ibid., XIII, 317.
230 Burnett, OR. cit., p. 38 6 •
Journal, XII, 1230, 1250
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of the People, shall be so lost to the Exercise of common Understanding and ~ution, as to suffer the Civil to stoop to
Military Power. 2
Adams was quite irritated. In his letter he mentioned that the French Count
D'tstaing Who had arrived with his fleet in July had fired a thirteen gun salute
to the Army but none to the Congress. Such anxieties and disputes continued
to prevent some of the Congressmen from cooperating as well as they might
have with the Continental Army and Washington.
At the time of Washington's visit to Congress he shared his impressions
with Benjamin Harrison. The General thought that the states must cooperate if
the nation was to survive the war. There was a "lax of public virtue" which
concerned the General as he knew the colonies were too committed to the
cause of the revolution to withdraw or become indifferent. This lengthy quotation demonstrates Washington's genuine concern.
I have seen nothing since I came here to change my opinion of
Men or Measrs. but abundant reason to be convinced that our
Affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous, and deplorable condition than they been Since the commencement of the ·War ... If I
was to be called upon to draw a picture ... from what I have seen,
heard. and in part know I would in one word say that idleness,
dissipation and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold of most
of them •.. That party disputes and personal quarrels are the
great business of the day whilst the momentous concerns of an
empire ... are but secondary considerations and postponed from
231 Letters , nI, 458.
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day to day, week to week as if our affairs wore the most promising aspect; after drawing this picture, which from my Soul I
believe to be a true one I need not repeat to you that I am
alarmed and wish to see my Countrymen roused. 2 32
Washington was convinced that the states should send their ablest men to
Congress since "these characters must not slumber, nor sleep at home, in
such times of pressing danger; they must not content themselves in places of
honor. . while the common interests of America are mouldering and sinking
into ... ruin in which their must ultimately be involved. 1.233 Sectionalism
blinded the Congressmen occasionally to the needs of the Continental Army and
the cause of the colonies . Washington retained a vision of an America where
all the colonies accepted their responsibiUties and contributed to the commonweal.
During this visit Washington was concerned with the pay of the army,
arms, clothing, and plans for the cOming campaign. Military stores were still
required for the success of the army. With Clinton in New York Washington
knew the army might have to take the offensive and this type of warfare consumed more war suppUes .234 In late January the General requested Congress
232Writinas, XIII, 466-67.
233 Jbid . ,
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to grant him leave to return to camp. Washington was sensitive to the hardships his soldiers endured while many of these legislators enjoyed the city
comforts of Philadelphia with its many parties. On February 2, 1779, Washington gladly departed from Philadelphia for his camp at White Plains.
'When he arrived at camp he began his preparations for the spring campaign. By April Washington had not yet received all the reports as he asked
General Knox to check what was needed so that he could order it from the
BOard of War. Particularly there was a deficiency of small arms, powder, and
lead. 235 The General also informed the new President of Congress, Joseph
Reed, that the militia must come provided with arms since the Continental
magazines were exhausted. War materiel must have come into camp for
Washington wrote a general that 40 rounds would be sufficient for his
troops. 2 36 Washington had returned to an army lacking many of the essentials
necessary for winning a war, but he was forced to rely on Congress and ultimately trusted in their support.
Earlier in March the General congratulated Thomas Nelson of Virginia on
his return to Congress. In a letter, the citizen-general remarked that the
times called for "cool and dispassionate reasoning" as well as integrity, strict
235JlWL , XlV, 372.
236Ibid., XlV, 459.
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attention, and appUcation. More than ever before Washington thought that
political skill was required to steer Congress and keep it on the correct course.
Unanimity in our Councils, disinterestedness in our pursuits,
and steady perseverance in our national duty, are the only mean
to avoid misfortunes; if they come upon us after these we shall
have the consolation 0lJsf0wtng that we have done our best, the
rest is with the Gods.
Washington's interests in Congress were sincere and he desired a strong central authority that could weld the states into a strong union. Shortly after this
last letter, he wrote to George Mason that he could not fully express himself
since so many aCCidents occur in the mail but he did compare Congress to a
clock with each state representing a small part of it. All t..'le small parts, he
wrote, endeavour to put themselves in fine order "without considering how useless and unavailing their labour, unless the great wheel, or spring which is to
set the whole in motion, is also well attended to and kept in good order ... 238
Perhaps more than anyone in Congress Washington understood the importance
of unity and cooperation between the states, and the states and the army if
freedom was to be won and maintained for the colonies. Congress's distrust
of the army was difficult for Washington to understand since the soldiers were
237.!e!S.p XIV, 246.
238~, XlV, 301.
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citizens of the colonies. For the present the army was as necessary as Congress to protect the new nation.
As summer approached Washington grew alarmed over the condition of
the army. .,Our army as it now stands is but little more than the skeleton of an
army," Washington wrote to Gouverneur Morris, "and I hear of no steps that
are taking to give it strength and substance . .,239 So too he informed his
brother, John V/ashington, of his concerns in May,
This is no time for slumbering and sleeping; nor to dispute upon
trifles, when our Battalions are to full, supplies to provide, and
ruined finances to recover and at a crisis with Great Britain is
ready to put forth her utmost vengence .240
His letters repeatedly mention his fear that Congress would not be qualified
this spring, 1119, to handle the crises. "I have never yet seen the time in
which our affairS in my opinion, were at so Iowan ebb as at the present . .,241
Washington also informed Morris who was in Congress that should Clinton soon
attack he did not know what the consequences might be, but he feared the
worst. 242 While in this same mood the General wrote Congress that little aid
239Jl:2J:51H
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should be expected of the army in its present situation and that the militia were
too poorly armed to even defend themselves. He concluded that, "How this can
be remedied, and the army supplied, I know not. ,,243
Although tired of trying to get arms and powder from Congress and the
state assemblies, Washington continued to write, beg, and warn the legislators that without a strong well-supplied army the cause of independence would
soon be lost, possibly during this summer of 1779. On Iune 9, the General
·mote the Board of War that "I am really pained that our supplies of ammunition
should be so miserably low, and trust that proper measures have been taken to
place them on a more respectable footing. ,,244 For the remainder of the war
"Wash!ngton would plead and remind Congress of the need of war materiel and
Congress would continue to try to meet the army's demands. Friction between
the two groups of colonists, and between Congress and the army, would continue until the army was disbanded in 1783, but relations between Congress
and Washington would get no worse. The crises of the first years were passed
and experience would aid both the army and Congress.
In May of 1779, Washington believed what he wrote to Armstrong, a
Congressman from Pennsylvania ,. "The hour therefore is certainly come when
243.1!;Wl., p. 157.
244Vlfritinn,
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party differences and disputes should subside; when every Man, especially
those in office, should with one hand and one heart pull the same way and with
their whole strength. ,,245 This was Washington's vision that gave him patience
when he tired of fighting for every musket, carL"t"fdge, or grain of powder that
his army needed. The General felt that it was worth fighting for "this hour" of
unity for even if did not come in 1779, it would eventually come. Congressmen agreed that this was worth fighting for and continued to support their
General as well as they could.
In May, 1779, Clinton threatened West Point but only captured Stony
POint, a small outpost on the Hudson River. Mter the main part of the British
forces returned to New York Washington sent V'1ayne to recapture Stony Point.
On July 16, 1779, by means of a surprise attack vVayne took Stony Point but he
could not maintain the fort because of the lack of troops. On July 20, he removed the military stores and cannon before he destroyed the small fort. He
then led his troops back to camp near West Point. Here the Northern campaign
ended as Wa,hington's soldiers spent the summer strengthening West Point's
defenses and Clinton entrenched his army in New 'York. The remainder of the
war would be mostly fought in the Southern colonies but Washington's army

continued to harass the British about New York. The army still suffered from
24SIbid ., XV, 99.
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the scarcity of military stores and still had to face the miserable winter of.
1779-1780 but it would survive. Together, the Congress and the army survived the crises of those first four years of war and there would be more in the
remaining two, but the major crises were passed. Congress and Washington
had kept a fighting army in the field that threatened the British Army and this
had been the chief military strategy. So far it had worked and it would continue to work in the next two years.
When Congress had created their military arm, the Continental Army,
they had decided to guard its every motion. Like the earlier colonial assemblies they wanted the civil authority to be supreme, However, before the first
year ended Congress had experienced the difficulties of directing and supplying an army in war. The two worked very closely together often to the army's
detriment but their disputes and misunderstandings somehow seemed to heal.
At first Congress·s indecision to an all-out war for independence had hindered
their support of Washing'ton and the Continental Army. But even after July,
1776, Congress was still slow to fully support the war effort since their fear of
too strong an army dominated their military proposals. This fear of the army
and of a military dictatorship harassed the progress of the army's organization
and fostered the Conway Cabal. There were Congressmen who believed that
the states might "lose their liberties to some aspiring general wearing the
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uniform of the Continental army ... 246 They felt it was their duty to prevent the
rise of any Gaesar or Cromwell. These Congressmp.n had given birth to the
idea of the revolution and thought their cause was safe only in their hands.
Certainly they were wary of this new class of men, the generals.
But this fear of the military and a possible dictatorship did not blind
some of the Congress who recognized the excellent qualities of their
Commander-in-Chief and realized the necessity of supporting their army. John
Adams himself had stated that the' "Liberties of America depended upon him
(Washington), in a great d~gree. ,,241 Many in Congress worked cUligently to
supply the Continental Army with war materiel which was a tremendous task •.
Hancock and Laurens as Presidents of Congress continually exhorted the state
assemblies to furnish the ContineI),tal Army with military stores'. Congress had
successfully acquired muskets and powder for the army through the Frenchman,
Beaumarchais, which had made the war effort possible in 1116 and 1111. So
too, Congress assured the army further support with the French Alliance in
1778. Congress was concerned with the army's deficiencies and in its own way
tried to remedy them.
246M1ller, Sam Adam" p. 344, quoting Writings of Sam Adams. In,230.
247 Letters , I, 131.

109
V'lashington realized that there were parties within Congress and
usually he was patient in awaiting their decisions. He accepted their criticism and VIlillingly supported this body of legislators who frequently were igaorant of military matters. Although the General had won no major victories as
of 1779, he had kept the Continental Army together in the field and had engaged the British Army at Long Island,

Brandywin~,

and Monmouth. He had

also criven Howe's army from Boston, defeated the British at Trenton, and survived the winter of Valley Forge. Throughout these years Congress with all its
.shortcomings and fears had furnished the army with war materiel. On several
occasions Congress had even entrusted Vlashington with dktatorial powers as
Congressmen like Benjamin Rush realized, "General '"P/ashington must be invested with dictatorial powers for a few months or we are undone. The vis
inertiae of the Congress has almost ruined this country ... 248 V/ashington was
saddened by Congress I s distrust of his army. He was as

oppo~ed

to a dictator

as they were, and remarked that "I confess, I have felt myself greatly
embarrassed with respect to a vigorous exercise of military power. ,,249
Fortunately ;\7ashington and some Congressmen were above the routine
business of an army and a legislative assembly. They could see beyond the
248Porce, V, III, 1487.
249//ritings, X, 159.
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present crisis to a new form of government wherein independence would be
guaranteed. The common welfare of the United Colonies came before their personal desires. Many generals could not have done all the correspondence of
vvashington to the state assemblies and the Congress on behalf of his army's
needs. Frequently vv'ashington begged Congress to consider the serious condition of the Continental Army. Not many generals Nould have been as
subservient as General Nashington was to Congress. Viashington as a citizensoldier believed that civil authority must be superior to the military authority,
and he directed the Continental Army according to this principle. He realized
that Congress must be powerful if the Continental Army Nas 'to be maintained
and the independence of the colonies won.

vvashington wrote to Congressman

Joseph Jones in the summer of 1780 that,
Certain I am that unless Congress speaks in a more decision
tone; unless they are vested with powers by the several states
competent to the great purpose of war, or assume them as a
matter of right; and they, and the States respectively, act with
more energy than they hetherto have done, that our Cause 1s
10st. 250
Washington was a practical man who often had to argue with Congressmen who
were more concerned with political philosophy than with the present crisis that
faced Congress and the army. Since the General favored a strong civil
250Surnett, oR. cit. « p. 456.
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authority he recogr!.ized the weaknesses within Congress. He hoped that qualitied men Nould come to Congress so that the army and Congress might
cooperate in vvinning the 'Nar. So too he was disappointed when Congress
wasted valuable time in making military decisions which injured the well-being
of the army.

Most of all he wanted Congress and the army to overcome their

petty "jealousies."
All these factors made it more difficult for the Congress to adequately
supply the arrny;,rvith the much needed military stores. Congress tried to meet
the army's demands and had partially performed their difficult task. By the fall
of 1777, the major powder crisjs had passed but muskets continued to be
Nanted.

Military stores were neuer adequate during the war but the deficiency

in July, 1779, ws.s much less than the scarcity of arms and powder that
"ashingtcn had to accept as his army 1c.id siege to Boston in the winter of
1775. Perhaps the Congress and the army were the victims of

~

war that was

too great for a rural country.Yith limited manufacturing. Alexander Hamilton in
1779 reflected on the first years of the war for independence in a letter to
Robert Morris:
The war , particularly in the first periods,
beyond our strength, to which neither our
were equal. We have the fullest proof of
thinness of our armies, ••. the scarcity of

required exertions
population nor riches
this, in the constant
hands in husbandry,
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and other occupations; the decrease of our staple commodities;
and difficulty of every species of supply.251
Together Congress and the army challenged a great empire. Despite
their many differences and frustrations, Congress and the army had cooperated.
Although there had been mismanagement within Congress, the army had been
supplied with war ulSteriel. The Continental Army remained a loyal instrument
in the hands of Congress and as long as Washington was Commander-in-Chief
the legislators need not have feared a dictatorship. Civil authority would
remain superior to military power, and yet only in union could independence
be won and preserved. Together the Congress and Continental Army would
pursue the war until it ended in their favor, and then the army would disband
to allow Congress to guide and govern the new nation.

251Montross,

OPe

cit., p. 243, quoting Hamilton, I, 116-11.
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